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FOREWORD

The following study is in some ways not a traditional treatment of
the American Civil War.

Consequently, it is the purpose of this intro

duction to prepare any potential reader for what lies ahead.

Civil War

historians have long written of the "American Iliad," as it is sometimes
called, as if it simply appeared, from a military perspective, out of
nowhere, with no preceding experiences which influenced its course nor
any consequences which resulted from it.

In short, "tunnel vision" has

been a characteristic trait of many chroniclers of the War of the Rebellion.
This work, therefore, attempts to go beyond the usual limits of
Civil War history to examine what effects the preceding three hundred
years of European and American military history had on the effort of
General William Tecumseh Sherman to feed, clothe, arm, and accoutre his
bluecoats during the Atlanta Campaign of 1864.

And further, the results

of this experience on later attempts by Americans and Europeans to feed
their armies in time of war are briefly traced through World War One, when
all western armies came to rely on their own internally administered and
organized supply systems to fill their armies' material needs.
Because this study endeavors to take the so-called long view of the
Atlanta Campaign and how it fits into the whole of western military history,
it may be helpful to read it in a certain order.. Read the first chapter
in its entirety, and then peruse the last four pages of the text.
way, the long view will become apparent.

In this

Next, go back and read all of

78540^

c h a p t e r s two t h r o u g h s i x .

The r e s u l t s h o u l d b e a much c l e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d 

ing of the supply of Sherman's armies during the Atlanta Campaign.
And f i n a l l y , t o a l l b u t t h e m o s t d e d i c a t e d o f m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n s , a
logistical study would seem to be endlessly boring and inconsequential.
I n t r u t h , h o w e v e r , l o g i s t i c s o r s u p p l y h a s h a d more e f f e c t on m i l i t a r y
h i s t o r y t h a n i s commonly r e c o g n i z e d , a n d t h e f i r s t f e w p a g e s o f c h a p t e r
one should firmly establish that fact.

Hence, i t i s a further purpose

° f t h i s w o r k t o d i s p e l some o f t h e w i d e l y h e l d m y t h s c o n c e r n i n g t h e way
in which Sherman's blue columns were provisioned on their march to Atlanta
a n d how t h e u l t i m a t e Union v i c t o r y w a s i n o n e way a t l e a s t d u e g r e a t l y t o
a superb supply network.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To my parents, who made it all possible
To June, who is making and will make it all possible
To Willie, who discovered my interest, and to Danny, who nurtured it
To the "crew," who understand the period and its people
To Dr. Grant, whose consistent help and advisement over the years
has proved invaluable
To Dr. Matthews, whose keen eye was greatly appreciated
To all my teachers, who taught me how and why
To the National Society of the Colonial Dames of America in the
State of Georgia, whose generous scholarship provided the
necessary funds
And to all those whose labor and thoughts have contributed more than
mere words can convey

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Chapter II:

Chapter III:

Chapter IV:

Chapter V:

Chapter VI:
BIBLIOGRAPHY

"SHERMAN WILL MOVE IF HE HAS TO EAT HIS MULES,"
SEPTEMBER 19, 1863 - MAY 5, 1864

1

25

"SIR, I GIVE YOU 48 HOURS OR A POSITION IN THE FRONT RANKS,"
MAY 5 - MAY 23, 1864
52
"IT BEATS ALL HOW MUCH IT RAINS HERE,"
MAY 23 - JULY 17, 1864...
"THE SINGLE THREAD THAT CONNECTS US WITH HOME AND SUPPLIES
IS BROKEN," JULY 17 - SEPTEMBER 2, 1864

66

84

"THE GREAT QUESTION OF THE CAMPAIGN WAS ONE OF SUPPLIES".. 105
116

MAPS

MAP 1.

UNION MILITARY RAILROADS USED BY SHERMAN IN 1864

29

MAP 2.

MOVEMENTS OF ARMIES FROM MAY 5 - MAY 23, 1864

53

MAP 3.

MOVEMENTS OF ARMIES FROM MAY 23 - JULY 17, 1864

67

MAP 4.

MOVEMENTS OF ARMIES FROM JULY 17 - SEPTEMBER 2, 1864

85

MAP 5.

ROUTE OF WHEELER'S RAID

93

CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

An important factor in the victory of William Tecumseh Sherman in
the Atlanta Campaign in 1864 was his ability to supply his three Union
armies.

Without the logistical system devised by Sherman and his staff,

the fate of the Confederate forces would have been much longer in doubt.
An examination of the successful Union system reveals that it was based
on centuries of military experiences, and its background should be ex
plored in order to understand more fully its operation.
In his The Art of War (1838), Henri Antoine Jomini, the French mili
tary historian-theoretician who greatly influenced Civil War generals,
set forth the five "purely military"^ branches of war.

They were:

egy, grand tactics, engineering, tactics, and logistics.2

strat-

Of these, the

last, logistics, has received the least amount of attention from military
historians, most of whom may be grouped in the traditional "drum and trum
pet" school of military writers, whose imagination is not readily engaged
by the seemingly "dry as dust" concerns of logistics.
The term logistics, which may be freely interchanged with supply, is
derived from the Greek word logistikos, meaning "skilled in calculation."
And in Roman and Byzantine times, there was an army official known as the
O
logista, whose duties involved a great deal of mathematical calculation.

1-Henri Antoine de Jomini, The Art of War (Philadelphia:
Lippincott and Company, 1862), p. 11.

J. B.

^Ibid.
•^Robert W. Coakely and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and
Strategy, 1940-1943 United States in World War II Series (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1955), p. 3.

2

After centuries of subsequent development, the expression today embraces
the area not only of supply but also of transportation, hospitalization
and evacuation, service, and a host of other functions which provide for
an army's material needs.^
Most military historians, however, write as if armies were somehow
automatically and magically clothed, armed, and fed.

James A. Huston,

one of the few military historians to deal with the question of supply
in United States military history, wrote:

Too often in military history one is disposed to follow in close detail
the movements of corps and divisions and companies on the battlefield
without inquiring how they got there. Great armies appear, fullblown,
from nowhere, do battle, then disappear. If they are brought to life,
we must see how they lived.5

In a recent revisionist work by Martin Van Creveld entitled Supply
ing War:

Logistics From Wallenstein to Patton, the author dealt more

directly with the traditional neglect shown to logistical matters:

While absolutely basic, this kind of calculation does not appeal to the
imagination, which may be one reason why it is so often ignored by mili
tary historians. The result is that, on the pages of military history
books, armies frequently seem capable of moving in any direction at almost
any speed and to almost any distance once their commanders have made up
their minds to do so. In reality, they cannot, and failure to take cog
nizance of the fact has probably led to many more campaigns being ruined
than ever were by enemy action.

^James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775-1953
Army Historical Series (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Mili
tary History, United States Army, 1966), p. viii. Hereinafter cited as
Huston, Sinews.
-*Ibid. , p. ix.
^Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to
Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 1-2. Herein
after cited as Van Creveld, Supplying War.
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Given this traditional neglect of supply, it is time for military
historians to begin to look at what factors limit an army's operations,
that is, how it is supplied while moving, and how the course of the cam
paign is affected by the success or failure of the supply arrangements.''
Thus, with these considerations in mind, it is the purpose of this study
to examine the most successful of all logistical efforts in the Civil War—
the Atlanta Campaign—and the developments in preceding centuries which
paved the way to Sherman's masterpiece of supply during the summer of 1864.
In order to understand the technological and organizational factors
which determined the course of supply efforts during the Civil War, it is
necessary to look at some previous successful and unsuccessful supply at
tempts in European and American military history.

During the seventeenth

century, well-developed bureaucratic states did not exist in Europe.
Therefore, armies were not provisioned by magazines established for the
storage and issuance of supplies, because these structures required

a

great deal of administrative and organizational talents, both of which
were absent in that period.

Instead, they lived by purchasing or requi

sitioning provisions from the countryside.

Under this system, commissaries

attached directly to the army were sent out to organize the resources of a
town or region so that the supplies were ready for the troops when they
arrived.

Also, sutlers contracted with the armies to provide certain

material items and eventually to supply arms, food, and fodder, the cost
of which was deducted from the soldiers' pay.

In many cases, wars were

begun for the primary purpose of moving an army out of its own country

^Ibid., p. 3.

4
and into that of an enemy, in order to live off his resources.

In most

%

movements, armies were tied to major rivers for transportation, primarily
because it was easier to move bulky supplies by water than overland in
wagons.

Throughout the centuries prior to the American Civil War, the

quantity of ammunition carried on a campaign was not critical, because
battles were so infrequent that large stocks of shot, shell, musket balls,
g
and gunpowder were not needed.

The best practitioners of this general

supply system were the Swedish general Gustavus Adolphus, the Imperial com
mander A. W. von Wallenstein, and Maurice of Nassau.^
The system for supplying the needs of armies in the eighteenth cen
tury did not change markedly.

Usually, a letter threatening destruction

of the town was sent by a general prior to the arrival of his troops.
Fully believing the commander's threat, the townspeople hurriedly gathered
the "requested" provisions.

Although payment was not assured, usually the

supplies were paid for in cash when the army arrived.

Afterwards, the

troops were quartered in the town until the fodder, which was always quickly
exhausted, ran out.

Then the army gathered in what provisions remained

and moved on to a new town.

During these marches, a regular transport ser

vice was not used because wagons were supplied by contract or carts were
requisitioned from peasants.

As in the previous century, water transpor

tation, for which barges were primarily used, was vital.

This logistical

system worked so well and so easily that it was not until 1783 that the
first army-organized supply corps was set up by the Austrians. They turned
to this arrangement only because their troops, like most soldiers in the

8Ibid.,

pp. 35, 57, 63.

^Ibid., pp. 7-13.
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eighteenth century, tended to be "the scum of the earth, enlisted for
drink,often deserted when assigned to supply parties sent to scour
the countryside for provisions.

One of the most prevalent myths about

armies of this period is that they lived off supplies stored in magazines.
Only about ten percent of an army's commissary needs were supplied by
magazines, because lengthy storage of food and fodder was not feasible
and transportation was not organized well enough to deliver the provi
sions to the army in the field quickly or efficiently.

The other ninety

percent of an army's commissary requirements were provided by purchase
or direct requisition when on the march.
Less than a century later, the Atlanta Campaign of 1864 was nearly
a complete break with that earlier supply system.

With the exception of

forage, which was gathered in tremendous quantities from the local coun
tryside by both the Union and Confederate armies, General Sherman's armies
lived off the great chain of supply bases from Louisville, Kentucky to
Nashville and Chattanooga, Tennessee, all of which were connected by rail
roads.

Also, the Atlanta Campaign is particularly noteworthy for the

astonishingly large amount of ammunition that was used.

The recently

developed rifled-musket and rifled artillery and the daily contact of
the opposing forces which characterized the campaign caused the great
increase in ammunition expenditure over previous centuries.
The earlier campaigns of Napoleon Bonaparte, however, produced some
important changes in logistics.

Beginning in 1805, Napoleon bypassed his

regular supply organization and communicated directly with his corps commanders

10Ibid.,

p. 34.

X1Ibid.,

pp. 17-34.
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concerning matters of supply and transportation.

Corps staff officers

with the titles of ordonnateur and commissionaire de guerre were respon
sible for the procurement of provisions.

Usually monetary contributions

were levied for the purchase of supplies which were collected in advance
along the army's line of march. Receipts were given which could be redeemed
at a later date when they were presented to French authorities.
tion, baggage was kept to a minimum, even for officers.

In addi

With this stream

lined system, Napoleon's armies made very rapid marches, which contributed
significantly to their success on the battlefield.33
Each marshal practiced a great deal of personal freedom in feeding
his troops along the line of march by using his ordonnateur to organize a
region's resources.

Thus, local authorities were told how much supplies

they were to deliver to Napoleon's troops and their animals and where to
deliver them.34

This system worked well as long as the French marched

through rich agricultural land.

During the campaigns in Poland, Spain,

and Russia, however, the French troops experienced much hardship because
of the poor farms of those countries.33
The most thoroughly planned of Napoleon's military adventures was the
invasion of Russia in 1812.

Because of his experiences in Poland, Napoleon

organized a transport service for his army which was intended primarily
to carry food.

He even went so far as to stockpile rations in anticipation

33Ibid.,

p. 43.

13Ibid.,

pp. 73-74.

14Ibid.,

pp. 52-53.

15David

York:

Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New
Hippocrene Books, Inc., 1976), p. 129.

7

of the approaching campaign.

Despite his extensive preparations, Napoleon's

supply system broke down in Russia for a variety of reasons.

First, French

army wagons were too heavy for the primitive roads of Russia, which were
turned into virtual quagmires by heavy thunderstorms.

Second, the Vilnya

River, which the French planned as a supply route, proved to be too shallow.
Third, lax discipline led to wanton plundering of supplies from the coun
tryside rather than orderly and systematic requisitioning.

Fourth, as a

result of the plundering, local inhabitants fled before the advancing
French troops and could not be hired for supply administration purposes
as was customary.

And fifth, the retreating Russian forces destroyed any

thing that could be used by the advancing French.

Even though this cam

paign was well provided for in advance, it could not succeed without the
availability of local supplies.-^
The military exploits of Napoleon in Russia in 1812 had some simi
larities and some marked differences to Sherman's march to Atlanta. Like
Napoleon, Sherman began his campaign with enormous stockpiles of provi
sions which could be drawn on during the campaign.

And, rainy weather

caused the supply wagons of both of these great commanders to become mired
down in muddy roads.

Sherman, however, could rely on railroads to keep

his troops supplied and moving forward despite the weather. On one occasion
though, during June, 1864, weather brought the Union forces in Georgia to
a halt, and despite the railroad, they had to wait for the onset of good
weather before resuming the campaign.

Napoleon had no choice but to wait

for drier weather to resume his march to Moscow.

16

Van Creveld, Supplying War, pp. 61-65.
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The problem of rain affected the two campaigns differently.

As

Napoleon's troops advanced farther and farther into Russia and their sup
ply system became more and more strained, discipline broke down and plun
dering for provisions ensued.

Though Sherman's men plundered some, examples

of this conduct were few, and the perpetrators were usually caught and
dealt with severely by officers.

As the Russian troops withdrew before the

.trench in 1812, they destroyed much that could have been of use to Napoleon.
General Joseph r,. Johnston's army in Georgia did the same as Sherman advanced,
but the practice was not as widespread or as thorough because the Union
advance was too rapid to permit complete destruction of crops, the rail
road, and other useful resources.
Napoleon s troops and those of Sherman relied on local supplies of
fodder to supplement their respective armies' issue of forage.

Unlike

Napoleon, however, Sherman was travelling through largely undeveloped
land enabling the Union forces to procure enough fodder on nearby farms
to meet their needs.

Both the French and the Union armies issued receipts

for their requisitions, but Sherman never resorted to direct levies of
money as did Napoleon.
It thus appears that the European tradition of supply during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was one primarily of organized plun
der.

Instead of relying on a supply apparatus organized and administered

by their own armies, commanders either took or bought what they needed
from local inhaoitants.

This practice was made necessary by the lack of

well-developed bureaucracies in the nations of Europe and was made possi
ble by the fact that much of the continent had been farmed for centuries
and food was in abundance, with countries like Poland and Spain being the
exception.

9

American Civil War commanders were familiar with these European mili
tary experiences and were influenced by them.

In addition, the logistical

efforts in several American military campaigns were studied.

These efforts

should be examined in order to understand the conditions under which Amer
ican armies labored during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

For

the most part they were determined by the fact that, beginning in earliest
colonial times and extending well into the nineteenth century, the fairly
well populated coastal areas furnished the provisions of war, and the roads
in this region were serviceable.

In the interior, however, a near virgin

wilderness with very few roads and mostly dirt tracks existed, severely
limiting the size of armies.^
The British Saratoga Campaign, one of the most important movements
in the American Revolution, lasted from early summer through early
fall of 1777.

It was designed to permit the British to cut off the seat

of rebellion in New England by advancing south from Montreal and seizing
the Hudson River valley.

The principal British army in the operation,

which involved a three-pronged drive to secure the Hudson, was that of
General John Burgoyne.

Opposing him were the Continental forces under

General Phillip Schuyler.

Considering his line of march through the wilder

ness of northeastern New York, Burgoyne's supply arrangements were imbalanced.
He had too much baggage and too little transportation, thus diminishing
his mobility severely. As one military historian, Don Higginbotham, wrote:

There was the cumbersome 138-piece artillery train, most of which might
profitably have been left in Canada; the seemingly endless string of baggage

17Maurice

Matloff, ed., American Military History Army Historical
Series (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United
States Army, rev. ed., 1973), p. 38.
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vehicles, actually two-wheeled carts made of unseasoned wood, over thirty
of them laden with Burgoyne's resplendent wardrobe and store of champagne;
and the usual horde of women, children, dogs, and sutlers.-^

As a result, Burgoyne's progress southward was slow, and his army consumed
its supplies too quickly.
The British began auspiciously by capturing Fort Ticonderoga and with
it a large quantity of supplies, but thereafter the campaign did not go in
their favor.

At one point, they were forced to send a mounted raid into

Vermont to secure badly needed provisions and animals.

Burgoyne's basic

problem was that as he advanced southward, his supply line lengthened and
his undersized and poorly equipped transportation system could not bring
forward the needed provisions.

Schuyler, on the other hand}began collect

ing supplies for the expected invasion from Canada as early as the fall of
1776.

In addition, the timely arrival of shipments of French muskets,

uniforms, artillery, gunpowder, and tents contributed tremendously to Amer19
ican victory m the campaign.

Also, the American logistical network

worked as well in the Saratoga Campaign as at any time during the war. The
supplies that were collected the previous fall and the French equipment
proved sufficient to keep the northern army amply provided for.2^
Before the campaign ended, General Horatio Gates replaced Schuyler,
and the American force grew to 23,000 with the arrival of thousands of
militia.

Thus, when Burgoyne surrendered his force on October 18, 1777,

his supply had not only failed but he was outnumbered by three-to-one. In
18
Don Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military
Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789 The Wars of the United
States Series (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 188.
19
Huston, Sinews, pp. 48, 57.
2QIbid.,

p. 57.
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the Saratoga Campaign, the British opted for an overland march through the
wilderness of upper New York, rather than the usual method of using their
control of the sea to launch and provide for a campaign, a decision which
cost them an army.2^"
Though Sherman's march to Atlanta was not conducted in the same kind
of wilderness as Burgoyne's Saratoga Campaign, the Union commander was
also operating in an underdeveloped region.

Unlike Burgoyne, Sherman was

able to handle the situation by utilizing a vast network of railroads,
which in all fairness to Burgoyne were not available in his time, by bring
ing along enough wagons to transport his provisions, and by putting all
excess baggage in storage.
The late 1780s and early 1790s furnish another example of military
action with significant logistical features.

During the early years of

this period, settlers began to move into the Northwest Territory in large
numbers to carve farms for themselves out of this frontier wilderness.
As a result, the Indians and the frontiersmen clashed, indiscriminate
killing by both sides followed, and the United States government opted
for war against the Indians to settle the issue.

The first expedition

set out in September, 1790 under the command of Colonel Josiah Harmer,
whose troops were primarily militiamen from Kentucky and Pennsylvania
with a small contingent of Regulars.

His objective was to strike the

Indians in the upper Maumee and Wabash valleys.

Harmar's supply system

was ruined by a combination of human negligence and bad weather.

Con

tractors failed to deliver supplies; militiamen came to camp without the
provisions that were supposed to be furnished by their state governments;

21Ibid.,

p. 83.
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and frost killed the standing grass that was intended for the horses of
the pack train.

These logistical defects seriously hindered the campaign

and resulted in two defeats for Harmar in October near present-day Fort
Wayne, Indiana, ending the government's first attempt to subdue the Indians.22
The next punitive expedition began in August, 1791 with territorial
governor Arthur St. Clair in command.

His goal was to construct a string

of military posts deep into Indian country, stretching northward from his
base of operations at Fort Washington near Cincinnati, Ohio.

Again, logis

tical support was faulty, and St. Clair was not a strong enough leader to
overcome the difficulties.

The Army's quartermaster for the campaign was

Samuel Hodgdon, who did not arrive until September 10, after the fighting
23
had begun, and who was guilty of "mismanagement and negligence"^ through
out, according to James H. Huston.

As in Harmar's previous campaign, the

late arrival of supples and poorly trained and equipped reinforcements,
the added strain of the many camp followers on the limited provisions, the
cold weather which again killed the standing forage, and the lack of troop
discipline combined seriously to impede the ability of St. Clair to move
his troops effectively and efficiently in the wilderness conditions. After
establishing Fort Hamilton on the banks of the Miami River to serve as his
forward depot, St. Clair marched farther northward and built Fort Jefferson
in late October.

But when the Indians defeated the American troops on Novem

ber 3, St. Clair was forced to retreat to Fort Washington.

The disaster

^Ibid., p. 87. Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic:
The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846 The Wars of the United
States Series (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 17-22.
Hereinafter cited as Prucha, Sword.
22Huston, Sinews, p. 88.
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resulted in a committee of inquiry convened by the House of Representatives,
which exonerated St. Clair but placed much of the blame for the defeat on
0/
the Quartermaster Department.
The Army was expanded in 1792 and given a new designation, the Legion
of the United States.

General Anthony Wayne, who made a name for himself

in the Revolution, accepted command of the Legion, and he began to assemble
and train his troops during the summer of 1792.

Drilling his troops inces

santly for the next two years, Wayne gathered supplies and improved his
lines of communication.

Secretary of War Henry Knox even went so far as

to recommend that beef cattle be used as pack animals to transport rations.
As the food off their backs was eaten, they could be slaughtered and con
sumed; in essence, they would serve as walking meat rations.
his quartermaster, however, rejected the idea. 25

Wayne and

Still, after two years

of preparation, Wayne was not able to accumulate enough rations at his for
ward base at Fort Greenville to begin a campaign.
After fruitless negotiations with the Indians and facing the possi
bility of another march in fall weather, which contributed to the defeat
of both Harmar and St. Clair, Wayne launched his campaign during the sum
mer of 1794.

Along his line of march, he built Forts Recovery and Defiance

to cover his rear and facilitate the northward flow of supplies.

Wayne

finally cornered the Indians on August 20 in a wooded area northwest of
Fort Defiance on the Maumee River, where a tornado had uprooted the trees.
The resulting Battle of Fallen Timbers eliminated the Indian threat in the

^Ibid., pp. 87-88.

Prucha, Sword, pp. 22-28.

^^Prucha, Sword, p. 33.
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Northwest Territory, and the Treaty of Greenville, signed in 1795, officially ended the conflict.

26

As pointed out, the first two expeditions under Harmar and St. Clair
met with defeat because of a combination of bad weather, the wilderness
conditions in the Northwest Territory, and negligence on the part of con
tractors, state governments, and the Quartermaster Department in providing
rations and equipment.

Wayne, however, avoided a similar fate by patience

and diligence in training and providing for his troops.

And he had the

good sense to conduct the campaign during the summer, when he did not have
to worry about frost killing the standing forage.

The result was the vic

tory at Fallen Timbers.
Like Wayne, Sherman spent months meticulously planning and preparing
for his march to Atlanta,

He was also aided by a first-rate quartermaster

in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel James L. Donaldson.

One of the keys

to Wayne's success was the string of forts constructed to protect his sup
ply line.

Similarly, Sherman's ultimate victory was due in part to the

fortifications which protected his railroad supply line.
The Creek War of 1813-1814 was an obscure but important part of the
War of 1812 and offers some useful insights into the role of the indivi
dual in overcoming a potentially disastrous logistical situation.

The

harsh treatment of a group of Creeks who, on their return from Canada,
killed several white frontiersmen proved to be the spark that touched off
a smouldering situation and resulted in the split of the Creek Nation and
its plunge into civil war in 1812.

The United States became involved when

on August 30, 1813, white settlers at Fort Mims in the Mississippi Territory

^Ibid., pp. 28-42.

Huston, Sinews, pp. 88-89.
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north of Mobile were massacred by members of one of the warring Creek fac
tions.

In the meantime, the United States entered into conflict with the

British.

It was commonly believed by many Americans that any British land

ing on the Gulf Coast would find willing and able allies in the Creeks.
Therefore, the decision was made to launch a campaign to subdue the Creeks.
The first two expeditions, one moving from Georgia and the other from the
western portion of the Mississippi Territory, ended in failure because of
supply difficulties.

The next attempt was made by General Andrew Jackson.

On October 4, 1813, Jackson began to raise a militia force to tame
the Creeks.

The expedition marched southward and reached the Tennessee

River near Huntsville, where a supply depot appropriately named Fort Depo
sit was built.

When supplies did not come, Jackson sent Major William B.

Lewis, his quartermaster, back to Nashville, Tennessee to move the provi
sions along.

Lewis found that food was not arriving as planned because

its procurement was handled on a contract basis.
27
work satisfactorily during the War of 1812.

This arrangement did not

In the meantime, Jackson

turned the troops loose to live off the villages of friendly Indians.
With fall coming to an end, "a less ambitious and cautious commander,"
wrote Robert V. Remini, "might have paused before leading a winter cam
paign across the Lookout Mountains in Alabama, particularly when he had
neither sufficient supplies nor any organized commissary to obtain them.
Not Jackson.

He could not wait."29

2^Huston,

28

Jackson marched his troops deeper

Sinews, p. 103.

°Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire,
1767-1821 (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1977), p. 192. Herein
after cited as Remini, Course.
29Ibid.
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into wilderness territory and established Fort Strother as a base of oper
ations on the Coosa River.

Two quick victories over the Creeks followed

at Tallushatchee and Talladega in early November.
With the onset of cold weather, the low level of the Tennessee River
prevented the arrival of supplies from Nashville.

As a result, Jackson

again subsisted his troops off the countryside, and the wilderness they
were in provided very little food.30

Also, the enlistments of many volun

teers were running out, and they were determined to return home, where food
and winter clothing awaited them.

Brandishing a musket and threatening to

shoot the first man who tried to leave, Jackson "convinced" his soldiers
to remain despite their expired enlistments.
Finally on November 17, after continued grumbling from the troops,
Old Hickory agreed to take the militia contingent of his force and march
to Fort Deposit to check on the supply situation, while the volunteers
remained at Fort Strother to keep the dying ember of the campaign alight.
After only a few miles march, Jackson and the militia met the long-awaited
supply column, and the men gorged themselves on the beef and flour which
were meant for the entire command.

After marching back to the fort and

telling of the feast, the volunteers threatened mutiny because they had
not benefited from the unexpected meal.

Again, Jackson threatened to shoot

31
the mutineers in order to gain control of the situation.
From the middle of November on, the flow of supplies to Fort Strother
was regular, thanks to the efforts of Major Lewis back in Nashville.

The

situation improved steadily, and by February, 1814 the arrival of fresh

-^Huston, Sinews, p. 111.
31
Remini, Course, p. 198.

17

volunteers from Tennessee together with the addition of the 39th United
Sates Infantry brought Jackson's force up to 5,000.

Not wishing to lose

this advantage, Old Hickory began the offensive which culminated in the
total defeat of the Creeks at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend on March 27.
The resulting Treaty of Fort Jackson, signed on August 9, ended the Creek
War.
In Andrew Jackson's case, the force of will cannot be denied.

He

decided that his campaign against the Creeks would succeed despite the fact
that it was plagued by supply problems, forced to move through an untouched
wilderness while literally hacking out a line of march, and threatened by
several mutinies; and it did!
Jackson used his great willpower to keep his campaign going.
he overcame tremendous adversities.

With it

Sherman used his own forceful person

ality in a different way to achieve the same end as Jackson.

Final auth

ority concerning all quartermaster duties and all matters relating to the
military railroads rested with Sherman.

In essence, Sherman used his force

of will to prevent adversity from occurring.
During the Mexican War of 1846-1847, the march of General Zachary
Taylor's army into northern Mexico was one of the most successful and inno
vative examples of logistical support prior to the Civil War.

The campaign

took place in the vicinity of the Rio Grande River and southwestward to the
Mexican towns of Monterrey and Saltillo.

On June 14, 1845, at the behest

of the federal government, General Taylor began to transfer his troops,
whose personal baggage allowance was severely limited during the entire
campaign, from Fort Jesup on the Louisiana frontier to the Gulf coast of
Texas, there to back up President James K. Polk's assurances of protection

from Mexico for Texas which was recently annexed by the United States.
After embarking at New Orleans, the bulk of Taylor's troops travelled
aboard steamships and sailing vessels to Corpus Christi at the mouth of
the Neuces River, while the dragoons (soldiers who travelled on horseback
and fought primarily on foot) rode overland through San Antonio to rende
zvous with the rest of the command.

By late August, all of Taylor's sol

diers had arrived, and reinforcements joining them in September brought
his strength up to 4,000.

Corpus Christi was occupied for seven months,

and the job at hand, according to James A. Huston, was "immediate supply
for the troops and the build-up of the stores and transportation facili
ties for the support of possible military operations.
When negotiations with Mexico broke down in January, 1846, President
Polk ordered Taylor to secure the Rio Grande which Texas claimed as its
southern boundary. The two hundred mile sun-baked trek to Port Isabel, at
the mouth of the Rio Grande, began on March 8, while supply ships preceded the
troops and unloaded provisions to set up a supply base. After the battles of
Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma in early May and a quarrel with the Quarter
master Department over the absence of pontoon bridging equipment, Taylor
finally invaded Mexico proper by seizing Matamoros on the south side of
the Rio Grande on May 18, five days after war was declared by Congress.

This

city was quickly developed into the Army's principal supply depot in northern
Mexico, while the offensive to capture Monterrey, one hundred and thirty
miles distant by way of Camargo on the San Juan, was planned.

From mid-

July till the end of August, the supplies to fuel this operation

•^Huston, Sinews, p. 138. K. Jack Bauer, The Mexican War, 1846-1848
The Wars of the United States Series (New York; The Macmillan Company,
1974, p. 89. Hereinafter cited as Bauer, Mexican.
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arrived steadily, but the influx of reinforcements put a strain on Taylor's
. •
33
provisions.
On August 19, the march to Monterrey began when the army advanced to
Camargo, where an advanced depot was established.

Because of the shallow

ness of the Gulf around the mouth of the Rio Grande, shallow-draft vessels
had to be used to ferry provisions to the barrier islands just offshore.
From there, they were conveyed by small schooners and wagons to Matamoros
where the river steamers transported them upriver to Camargo.

This was

the first use of such river vessels by the Army in supplying its troops.
A year earlier, General Thomas S. Jesup, Quartermaster General of the Army,
suggested the construction of a railroad to connect the Brazos River, far
ther north on the Texas coast, with the Rio Grande.

There is no doubt

that this railroad would have worked miracles in supplying Taylor's army,
but the proposal was not followed through because of the lack of funds.
Becoming impatient with the slowness of the Quartermaster Department in
stockpiling provisions for this offensive against Monterrey, Taylor sent
some of his own staff officers back to the United States to purchase or
charter more steamboats to shuttle supplies from Matamoros to Camargo.
They returned with 12 of these vessels, and by late July the flow of pro
visions was sufficient not only to provide for Taylor's army but also to
34
prepare for a march farther into Mexico.
The only problem holding the army back was the lack of enough mules
and wagons for overland transportation of supplies.

Because the wagons

were of several types and thus could not be cannibalized for spare parts

33Huston,
34Ibid.,

Sinews, pp. 138-140.
pp. 140-141.
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when they broke down, only 180 of them were used.

As a result, 1,900 pack-

mules, each with a carrying capacity of 300 pounds, were used as the prin
cipal means of transporting provisions.
of items to carry:

These animals had quite a variety

"tents, tentpoles, kettles, mess pans, axes, picks,

coffee mills, ammunition chests, and all the other gear,"35 as well as
extra rations not carried by the men.

Due to the relatively small number

of packmules and the arid and barren country between Monterrey and Saltillo,
which contained only small amounts of standing forage, the size of Taylor's
force was limited to 6,000, most of which was infantry.

Along the line of

march, the only commodity that was in abundance was beef, which was pur
chased from the inhabitants.

Flour to be issued as the bread ration was

carried by the pack animals and wagons. All the preparations were arranged
by the regimental quartermasters, whose additional duties entailed "buying
forage, distributing clothing to the men, buying fresh food to supplement
the ration, and keeping the regimental accounts."^6

After a short march

from Camargo to Cerralva, during which additional provisions were gathered
07
locally, Taylor was ready to move against Monterrey on September 12.
The army arrived at Monterrey on September 19, and after five days of
fighting, the Mexicans were forced to retreat. Taylor's next objective, the
city of San Luis Potosi, was roughly two hundred and fifty miles south of Mon
terrey. In thinking over the possibility of marching there, Taylor admitted,
"the great question of supplies necessarily controls all the operations in a

^^Ibid., p. 143.
~^Ibid., p. 142.
37lbid., pp. 141-142.
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country like this."^®

The region that would haye to be marched through

was barren and offered no provisions for local procurement.

To attempt

such an operation would necessitate a force of 20,000 men, half of them
Regulars, to be able to guard the doubled length of the supply line and
to do battle with the Mexican Army at the same time.
The next and last major engagement for Taylor's army was on February
22 and 23, 1847.

In the Battle of Buena Vista, the Mexican Army of Gen

eral Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna was defeated and retreated through the
same unfertile country to San Luis Potosi that Taylor had contemplated
traversing.

In the process, Santa Anna's soldiers suffered miserably

from lack of provisions.

This example and the habit of regular Mexican

cavalry and mounted partisan units of attacking pack trains on the extended
American supply lines convinced Taylor to remain in the vicinity of Monter
rey and Saltillo.

Had he made the attempt to march to Mexico City, his

supply line would have stretched for over one thousand miles back to Camargo.
Instead of trying to carry out such an impossible operation, Taylor advo
cated holding a defensive line in northern Mexico while Mexico City was
taken by way of Vera Cruz, which was done by General Winfield Scott.^
Throughout General Zachary Taylor's campaign in Mexico, the American
troops under his command were well uniformed, equipped, armed, and fed.
And when compared to some of the United States Army's previous logistical
efforts (i.e., Harmar's and St. Clair's expeditions and the early stages
of the Creek War), the achievement seems even greater.

The steam vessels

~^Ibid., p. 144.
39lbid., pp. 143-144.

Bauer, Mexican, pp. 218-221.
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and packmules employed in the Mexican War were also novel features in logis
tical support.
Taylor's use of steamboats for supply in northern Mexico presaged
their successful use by Sherman during the Atlanta Campaign. Also, Taylor
employed the Mexican towns of Camargo and Monterrey as temporary depots in
advance of the main depot at Matamoros.

This arrangement was very similar

to the depot system used by Sherman in 1864.

But, as well as Taylor's

troops were supplied, Sherman would do better.
The logistical aspects of the campaigns in Europe during the seven
teenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries were limited primarily
by such factors as the transportation systems available and the distri
bution of rich farming regions.

Armies tended to follow the course of

navigable rivers because the river vessels available during those centur
ies could carry much larger quantities of supplies than wagons travelling
overland.

When not following major rivers, these same armies by necessity

campaigned in areas where food was plentiful.
Similar factors limited military operations in North America.

For

most of the period under consideration, American armies marched and fought
in untouched wilderness, where the modes of transportation severely lim
ited their movements.

For instance, Burgoyne attempted to traverse the

unsettled wilds of northern New York with too much baggage and too little
reliable transportation.

As a result, his army could not sustain itself

and was forced to surrender.

On the other hand, the American Generals

Schuyler and Gates drew on stockpiled provisions from the well-developed

^Ibid., Huston, Sinews, pp. 144^146.
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lower Hudson Valley, and they triumphed.

The first two expeditions against

the Indians in the Northwest Territory failed primarily because not enough
attention was given to supplying troops as they marched through the wilder
ness.

The campaign directed by Wayne succeeded because he gave much atten

tion to provisioning and training his troops,

The early stages of Jackson's

march against the Creeks were plagued by massive supply problems resulting
from the difficulties inherent in providing logistical support over hun
dreds of miles in undeveloped territory.

Through this troubled period,

Old Hickory kept his army together as much by personal intervention and
sheer will as anything. When the supply problem cleared up, total victory
over the Creeks resulted.
eral respects.

Taylor's campaign in Mexico was unique in sev

Transportation technology, which had not advanced beyond

the use of horses, wagons, and sailing ships for centuries, had so advanced
that an army could be kept well fed, clothed, and armed even in the unhospitable environs of northern Mexico.

Ocean-going steamships and shallow-

draft river steamboats made much of this logistical success possible. And
the innovative use of the packmule to transport supplies overland was an
equally important component in providing for Taylor's army.
The Atlanta Campaign incorporated many elements from earlier campaigns.
For instance, much reliance was placed on river transportation of supplies
which was done by the relatively new and roomy steamboats.

Since the cam-

paign took place in an underdeveloped region with no navigable rivers,
railroads were used to carry supplies as far forward as possible.

From

the nearest railhead, the shipment of provisions to the front was completed
in the traditional army supply wagon,

Sherman himself was in overall con

trol of the entire supply system, and his months of preparation did as much

24

as battle to secure victory.
In war, regardless of how good a general may be in terms of strategy
and tactics, if he cannot fill the material needs of his troops, he cannot
be successful.

As James A. Huston noted;

the evidence seems to point to the really great logistician as being the
commander who has the judgement—indeed the genius—to take into account
realistically all available resources, at home, in the theater, or whereever they are found, and to balance his requirements and his mission so
that his objective may be gained in the least possible time with the least
possible loss of men and supplies.^

The more immediate problem and indeed "the final measure of achievement,"
Huston continued, "must be the success with which men and materiel are
delivered to the fighting front.In light of this evaluation, and the
European and American supply efforts discussed earlier, the degree of suc
cess of General William T. Sherman's logistics in the Atlanta Campaign
will be determined.

^Ibid., p. 153.
^Ibid., p. 154.

CHAPTER II
"SHERMAN WILL MOVE IF HE HAS TO EAT HIS MULES,"
SEPTEMBER 19, 1863 - MAY 5, 1864

Though the Atlanta Campaign began on May 5, 1864, the logistical pre
parations that assured success for Sherman's armies commenced during the
late summer of 1863.

The Battle of Chickamauga on September 19-20 of that

year ended in defeat for the Union Army of the Cumberland under MajorGeneral William S. Rosecrans, whose troops, save a rearguard contingent
under the personal command of Major-General George H. Thomas, retreated
headlong northward the few miles to Chattanooga, which they had captured
only a few days before.

There they were put under siege by the Confeder

ate Army of Tennessee commanded by General Braxton Bragg, the victor at
Chickamauga.^
The situation quickly became critical.

Though "forage and subsistence

for some time still remained in the wagons"^ of Rosecrans' army, he had to
feed roughly 45,000 men, 3,000 wounded soldiers, and some 50,000 horses
and mules.

In the haste of the retreat from Chickamauga, the troops'blan

kets and overcoats had been left behind, and cold weather was approaching.
The Union supply line, the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, had been
interrupted by Confederate cavalry, thus necessitating an overland route
to the farthest point southward from Nashville that the railroad reached.

-'-Mark M. Boatner, III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York: David
McKay Company, 1959), pp. 149-153. Hereinafter cited as Boatner, Dictionary.
2The

War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of
the Union and Confederate Armies (128 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1880-1901), Ser. 3, Vol. IV, p. 879. Hereinafter cited
as OR, and series, volume, and part numbers will be given as an arabic
numeral for the first, a roman numeral for the second, and an arabic num
eral for the third, with the page number as an arabic numeral.
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The route chosen extended sixty miles through the Sequatchie and Tennessee
Valleys and over Walden s Ridge, a very difficult
in the best of weather.

way

for wagons even

The onset of fall rains in October, however, and

the frequent raids on the wagon trains by Confederate cavalry all but ended
this tenuous but last line of supply open to Rosecrans' army.
quences were dire.
rations, and

The conse

The Union soldiers in Chattanooga were put on half

the animals of the train [10,000 of whom died from lack of

forage ], starved to death, lined the roadside, the horses of the artil
lery died at the picket ropes.Beginning in late September, steps were
taken to rescue Rosecrans' beleaguered soldiers from imminent starvation.
The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, then serving with the Army of the Potomac
in the East, were transferred in toto by rail to Chattanooga.

Portions

of the Union troops in Memphis, Tennessee and Vicksburg, Mississippi were
moved by way of the Tennessee River to Bridgeport, Alabama. In mid-October,
Rosecrans was relieved, and Major-General Ulysses S. Grant was put in over
all command of the newly-created Military Division of the Mississippi, em
bracing the Departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and
the Arkansas, which included all the troops then converging on Chattanooga
as well as those already there.^

These emergency measures could not have

come sooner, because as one Union Army officer who witnessed the situation
observed, "the tenure of Chattanooga by the United States was by the merest thread."^
3
Huston, Sinews, p. 233.
40R,

3, IV, p. 879.

^Boatner, Dictionary, pp. 141-142, 555.
60R,

3, IV, p. 880.
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The first effort to clear a permanent supply line was made by the
contingent from the Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major-General Joseph
Hooker.

The operation in late October took four days to complete and opened

what became known as the "Cracker Line," named after the hard cracker bread
ration of the Union Army. The result was the free movement of small steam
boats on the Tennessee River as far as Kelly's Ford. Thereon the morning
of October 30, 1863, tons of forage and 40,000 rations arrived for the
starving animals and men of Rosecrans' former command, the Army of the
Cumberland, now under the able leadership of General Thomas.
erate siege, however, was not broken.

The Confed

In a three-day series of battles

beginning on November 23, Grant's forces swept Bragg's Confederates first
from Orchard Knob, a small hillock menacingly close to Chattanooga, then
Lookout Mountain which overlooked the city, and finally the main strong
hold of the besiegers, Missionary Ridge.

Having lost their bid to recap

ture the important communication center of Chattanooga, the Southerners
retreated southward to Dalton, Georgia, where they went into winter camp.
Soon after, Bragg was relieved and was replaced by General JosephE. Johnston,
who would be Sherman's opponent during the first half of the Atlanta Cam
paign.

With Chattanooga now safe, the Federals there began a winter of

refitting their armies and supply lines in preparation for the next year's
campaign.7
Just a few days after the Battle of Chickamauga, Quartermaster-General
of the Army Brigadier-General Montgomery C. Meigs, a native Georgian, was
sent from Washington to Chattanooga to oversee the revamping of the supply

7Huston,

Sinews, p. 233.

Boatner, Dictionary, pp. 142-147.
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network which would later support Sherman's march to Atlanta.

Meigs' first

task was to reorganize the upper echelons of the supply network in the Mili
tary Division of the Mississippi, which encompassed the area west of the
Appalachian Mountains to the Mississippi River and Arkansas.

Brigadier-

General Robert Allen, chief quartermaster of this command, was ordered to
Louisville, Kentucky, where he would set up the base of operations and
principal depot.

Lieutenant-Colonel James L. Donaldson took command of

the advance base of operations at Nashville, Tennessee.

The chief quar

termaster of the three Union armies in the vicinity, those of the Cumber
land, the Tennessee, and the Ohio, were, respectively, Major Langdon C.
Easton, Lieutenant-Colonel J. Condit Smith, and Lieutenant-Colonel G. W.
Schofield.8

The transfer of these exceptional quartermaster officers was

the first step toward restoring efficient supply in the Western Theater.
The next step, the reorganization and repair of the United States
Military Railroad network in the West, was necessary before the accumula
tion of supplies could begin. (See Map 1 on page 29 for railroads.)
backbone of this system was two railroads:

The

The Louisville and Nashville,

which remained under private ownership but gave priority to military traf
fic, and the Nashville and Chattanooga, which was operated solely by the
Army.

To supplement the work of these two lines, Secretary of War EdwinM.

Stanton, on October 22, 1863, authorized the building of a railroad from
Nashville westward to the Tennessee River.

The work would be done under

the authority of Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee.

After its

completion in May, 1864, this road was turned over to the government for

80R,

3, IV, pp. 879-881.

Map 1. From: Official Records of the
War of the Rebellion. Series 3, Vol. i
Page 29
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operation as a military railroad.

On November 30, Colonel Daniel C.

McCallum, nominal head of the military railroads, was promoted to BrigadierGeneral and sent to Tennessee.

According to his orders he was

appointed military director and superintendent of railroads in the United
States, with authority to enter upon, take possession of, hold, and use
all railroads, engines, cars, locomotives, equipments, appendages, and
appurtenances that may be required for the transportation of troops, arms,
ammunition, and military supplies of the United States and to do and per
form all acts and things that may be necessary and proper to be done for
the safe and speedy transport aforesaid.^

With McCallum came W. W. Wright, a military railroad engineer, and a por
tion of the Construction Corps which was organized to lay track for mili
tary railroads and which had served solely in the East.
At the beginning of the war, the Office of Military Railroads was
organized under the War Department and put under the supervision of the
Quartermaster Department.

Military railroads were those taken over by

Union forces as they marched southward and operated by the government for
military purposes until the war was over, when they were to be returned
to civilian ownership.

Until the end of 1861, the commander of a military

department was responsible for the operation of the government railroads in
his district.

Beginning in 1862, the running of these lines was put in the

hands of the military railroad officials, with the Quartermaster Department
providing the necessary supplies to keep them in operation.

90R,

3, III, p. 910.

10OR,

3, V, p. 974.

OR, 1, XXXII, 2, p. 329.
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McCallum's first job was to survey the railroads in his command and
determine their present state of repair.

On the Nashville and Chattanooga,

which he found in very bad shape, trains could travel only eight milesper-hour; and even with this precaution, accidents were still frequent.
McCallum recommended that it would "be true economy to relay the whole
1?
line with new rail,"
because "the track was laid originally on an unbal
lasted mud roadbed in a very imperfect manner, with a light U-rail on wooden
stringers, which were badly decayed, and caused almost daily accidents by
spreading apart and letting the engines and cars drop between them."33
The total of five hundred and nineteen miles under his supervision included:
the unfinished seventy-two miles of the Nashville and Northwestern from
that city to the Tennessee River; the Nashville and Chattanooga stretching
for one hundred and fifty-one miles; the Nashville and Decatur to Decatur,
Alabama and the Eastern Division of the Memphis and Charleston, combining
for one hundred and eighty-five miles to Stevenson, Alabama, where it joined
the Nashville and Chattanooga; and one hundred and eleven miles of unnamed
track extending from Chattanooga to Knoxville, Tennessee.

Over this im

mense network or rails, which had to transport the food and supplies for
three Union armies, there were only 70 locomotives and 600 cars.

McCallum

advised that 200 locomotives and 3,000 cars would be necessary before any
campaign southward into Georgia could be attempted.34

With the challenge

before him, Daniel McCallum began to reorganize and to rebuild the military
railroads that would make Sherman's Atlanta Campaign possible.

120R,

1, XXXII, 2, p. 144.

130R,

3, V, p. 982.

140R,

1, XXXII, 2, pp. 144-143.
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The two departments of the United States Military Railroad were the
Construction Corps and the Transportation Corps, and they were organized
in the Western Theater to run, maintain, repair, and construct the govern
ment railroads.

Originally, soldiers had been detailed to wrok on the

railroads, but by 1864, all of the men employed in these two corps were
civilians who were provided with room and board in addition to being paid
a wage.-^

When McCallum was first ordered to Tennessee, one division of

the Construction Corps came with him.

Its leader, W. W. Wright, was desm

ignated as "chief engineer of U.S. military railroads in the Military
Division of the Mississippi."

1 f)

By the end of November, 1863, the Corps had repaired the Nashville
and Chattanooga to Bridgeport, three weeks ahead of schedule and made pos
sible in part by efficient organization."^

As later reorganized and expand

ed, the Construction Corps consisted of six divisions and attained a maxi
mum strength of 5,000 men.

Each division operated independently so that

any one could respond to an emergency quickly by rail, wagon, or on foot.
The divisions were broken down into subdivisions, and the two most impor
tant of these were the bridge-builders and the track-layers.

The Trans

portation Corps was run by Colonel Adna Anderson as "general superintendent
of transportation on U.S. military railroads in the Military Division of
18
the Mississippi."

His corps was organized entirely from railroad men in

-^Riegel, "Federal Operation," p. 132.
160R,

1, XXXII, 2, p. 372.
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the West and was responsible for managing and maintaining the locomotives
and cars, or rolling stock.

Its maximum strength was 12,000, and it was

divided into three divisions.^

The largest facilities for maintaining

the rolling stock were located at Nashville and Louisville, with smaller
ones at Stevenson and Huntsville, Alabama, and Knoxville.

At Nashville,

there were extensive storehouses for spare parts, and repair shops which
could handle 1,000 cars and 100 locomotives at a time.

20

Even with all the reorganization and repair carried out by McCallum,
Wright, and Anderson, not enough cars and engines were on hand to build up
the enormous amount of supplies needed for the anticipated summer campaign.
The first of several measures taken to correct this situation came in March,
1864.

Upon authorization from President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton ordered

locomotive manufacturers to sell their products only to the military rail
road service.

Though government prices were lower than those on the open

market, the response was enthusiastic.

From February through May, a total

of 30 locomotives and 675 cars were delivered to McCallum at Nashville.
Despite this welcome increase in the amount of rolling stock, quartermaster
and commissary stores were still not building up as fast as they were needed
91
to prepare for the campaign.

March brought several changes in the com

mand structure of the Union Army in the Western Theater, which finally
corrected the supply situation and allowed provisions to accumulate.
Early in March, Grant was promoted to Lieutenant-General and given
command of the entire Union Army.

190R,
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duties, he and Sherman travelled together as far as Cincinnati, Ohio,
where they plotted the strategy for the campaigns of 1864.

The plan they

discussed was to be a coordinated effort on three fronts beginning in early
May to finish the destruction of the South.

Grant would direct the Army

of the Potomac in the East in its continuing effort to defeat General
Robert E. Lee and capture the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia.
In conjunction with Grant, Sherman was also given a promotion and put in
charge of the Military Division of the Mississippi on March 18.

He would

command the center of the grand Union advance and attempt to destroy Gen
eral Joseph E. Johnston's Army of Tennessee and capture the important Con
federate communication and manufacturing center of Atlanta.

General

Nathaniel P. Banks, commanding the Union forces on the lower Mississippi
River, was given the task of taking the port of Mobile, Alabama, one of
the South's remaining outlets to foreign markets.
When he returned to Nashville on March 25, Sherman's task was to secure
his lines of supply and communication and to organize his Armies of the
Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio for the campaign in Georgia.

In

summarizing his dilemma, he admitted that

the great question of campaign was one of supplies. Nashville, our chief
depot, was itself partially in hostile country, and even the routes of
supply from Louisville to Nashville by rail, and by way of the Cumberland
River, had to be guarded. Chattanooga (our starting-point) was one hun
dred and thirty-six miles in front of Nashville, and every foot of the way,
especially the many bridges, trestles, and culverts, had to be strongly
guarded against the acts of a local hostile population and of the enemy's
cavalry. Then, of course, as we advanced into Georgia it was manifest that
we should have to repair the railroad, use it, and guard it like wise.

22William
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Sherman's first step in resolving his great question of supplies was
to tour the campsites of his armies and to instruct their commanders to
23
begin preparations for the impending march southward.

He returned again

to Nashville on April 2 and was immediately faced with a problem concern
ing civilians, for whom he did not have a great deal of respect. The inhab
itants of eastern Tennessee, especially those around Chattanooga, were very
impoverished, and the commanding officers of posts in that vicinity had no
choice but to give food to the people or see them perish from starvation.
Upon hearing of this situation, Sherman put an immediate stop to it, "for
a simple calculation showed that a single railroad could not feed the armies
9/

and the people too, and of course the army had the preference."

Left

with no choice, these people turned to their own resources and managed to
feed themselves.
reasons.

This seemingly trivial incident is important for two

First, it showed that Sherman would not let anything, not even

providing for genuinely hungry people, stand in the way of feeding his
troops so that the campaign could begin as soon as possible.

Second, it

revealed the essential supply problem that Sherman faced throughout the
buildup and the course of the Atlanta Campaign.

That is, the single rail

road to which he referred, the Nashville and Chattanooga, was his primary
line of communication and supply.

In order to allow it to perform its

task, he instituted changes that brought him badly needed locomotives and
cars, auxiliary railroads, and alternate river supply routes.
Responding to complaints from the commanders of the Armies of the
Tennessee and the Ohio, Generals James B. McPherson and John M. Schofield,

23Ibid.,

p. 7.
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respectively, that the Army of the Cumberland was receiving preferential
treatment in terms of supplies, Sherman stated that he "took supreme con
trol of the roads myself, placed all three army commanders on equal foot
ing, and gave to each the same control, so far as orders of transportation
25
for men and stores were concerned."

After writing to Grant on April 2

complaining that the two railroads from Nashville to Chattanooga were barely
carrying enough provisions to subsist the troops and certainly not enough
to accumulate a large quantity, Sherman issued an order four days later to
rectify the situation.

All railroad cars were to be used exclusively for

the transportation of essentials, such as rations and ammunition.

Soldiers

returning to their units, from furlough or hospitals, were to be organized
into temporary detachments and used to drive to the front the herds of beef
cattle which would provide fresh meat to the army during the campaign. To
further facilitate the flow of supplies through Nashville by rail, all posts
within thirty miles of that city were to convey their supplies by wagon
only.

On April 10, as a final measure, all civilian freight and passen

gers were prohibited on the railroads south of Nashville.

Sherman esti

mated that these changes "nearly or quite doubled our accumulation of stores
at the front, and yet even this was not found enough."

2 f-)

Finally deciding to seek the opinion of others in resolving his dilemma,
Sherman met with his master of railroad transportation, Colonel Anderson,
his chief quartermaster at Nashville, Lieutenant-Colonel Donaldson, and
25
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his chief commissary, Brigadier-General Amos Beckwith.
needs of an army 100,000 strong with 35,000 animals.

They discussed the

They concluded that

130 box cars, each with a capacity of 10 tons, would have to arrive daily
at the fighting front to meet just the bare needs of the troops and their
animals.

Even with this number of cars, only 5 pounds of oats or corn and

no hay could be given to the horses and mules each day, which was far below
the prescribed allotment of 26 pounds of forage daily for horses and 23
pounds for mules.27

In order to provide for his animals, Sherman "expected

to find wheat and corn fields,"

OO

from which he could make up the differ

ence in forage by direct requisition of civilian corps.

At the time of

this meeting, only 60 locomotives and 600 cars were available, and at least
100 of the former and 1,000 of the latter were needed.

To solve this prob

lem, Sherman authorized Anderson to hold in Nashville cars arriving from
Louisville.

In this way, rolling stock would be built up to a level suf-

ficient to meet the Army's needs.

29

The equipment of three railroads was impressed.

Of 21 locomotives

seized, 17 came from the Louisville and Nashville, 2 from the Louisville
and Lexington, and 2 more from the Kentucky

Central.

Each of these

railroads lost 120, 15, and 60 cars, respectively, of the total of 195
impressed.jn response to this blatant breach of the rights of property,
James Guthrie, president of the Louisville and Nashville, complained directly
27
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to Sherman.

He was told to do as Sherman had done, that is, to hold cars

coming into Jeffersonville, Indiana, regardless of which railroad they
belonged to.

The eventual result was that rolling stock from as far away

as Michigan was seen with the Union forces in the Carolinas in 1865.

As

a last measure, Sherman demanded, in the same way that he had done with
the military railroads, that Guthrie suspend all civilian traffic for ten
O1

days to expedite the movement of supplies to Nashville and Chattanooga.
Finally, Guthrie gave whole-hearted cooperation by arranging with General
Allen, chief quartermaster in Louisville, for the use of a ferry boat to
transfer rolling stock quickly from Jeffersonville over the Ohio in order
to facilitate the accumulation of cars and locomotives for the Army.32
By May, 1864, things began to come together for Sherman's railroad
network.

The Nashville and Chattanooga had been repaired by the end of

November of the previous year.

The Nashville and Decatur, which had been

repaired by soldiers detailed from the command of the former railroad exec
utive Brigadier-General Grenville M. Dodge, and the Eastern Division of
the Memphis and Charleston were opened to traffic in March.

The Chatta

nooga and Knoxville, previously unfinished and unnamed, was completed on
April 13.

The Nashville and Northwestern, which had been turned over to

McCallum on February 17 by General Grant for completion, was finished in
May.

It was originally built to provide an alternate route for supplies

destined for Nashville by water during the summer and fall, when the
OI
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Cumberland River was too low for steamboats to ascend.

It ran for seventy-

two miles from Nashville to Johnsonville on the Tennessee River.

During

all seasons of the year, the Tennessee could handle steamboat traffic. Not
satisfied with just two railroads leading into Nashville, Sherman autho
rized the building of a third route during the summer of 1864.

This line

was pieced together from two small railroads, the Edgefield and Kentucky
and the Memphis, Clarksville, and Louisville.

It terminated at a point on

the lower Cumberland River, to which steamboats could ascend even in the
dry season.

And finally, the Western and Atlantic, the road in Georgia

which Sherman would use to move supplies directly to his front lines, was
repaired as far south as Ringgold, where a major Union supply depot was
33
constructed.

In all, the railroad mileage in operation in the Military

Division of the Mississippi during 1864 varied from seven hundred and fortyQ/

four to one thousand and sixty-two miles.
The degree of efficiency brought to Sherman's supply system can be
measured by the organization of the trains.

Four trains of 10 cars each

travelled together as a group, and they were limited to a speed of ten
miles-per-hour.

Four of these groups arrived in Chattanooga per day. Each

car had a capacity of 10 tons, thus resulting in an accumulation of 1600
tons daily.

It would have taken 36,800 six-mule-team wagons, each with a

capacity of 2 tons, travelling twenty miles daily to have equalled the work
of the railroads.

Considering the roads in Tennessee and Georgia in the

mid-nineteenth century, this was an impossibility.35
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Extensive provisions were made for rolling stock and track away from
the centers of repair at Nashville, Chattanooga, and other places.

Along

the Nashville and Chattanooga, for example, 45 new water tanks were built.
These were often constructed inside blockhouses, which were garrisoned by
a small detachment of soldiers responsible for protecting the track and
the water tank.

Blockhouses were also built to protect bridges.

Sidings

long enough to accommodate 8 freight trains were built every eight miles.
Most sidings were provided with telegraph stations, which tremendously
improved communications.
pocket "sounders."

The operators were equipped with devices called

If the railroad and the station were attacked, the

operator would flee and climb the nearest, safe telegraph pole which did
not have cut wires.

The sounder would be attached to the wire, and a sig-

07
nal for help could be sent to the nearest garrison.

In addition to these

arrangements for the security of the railroad lines, detachments of the
Construction Corps were quartered at various points along the trunk lines
and especially along the Western and Atlantic as Sherman's armies marched
deeper into Georgia.

They would set up temporary supply centers and stock

them with crossties, spikes, bridge timbers, and rails.

Anytime a break

occurred, either as the result of an accident or raids by Confederates,
crews would start to repair it from both ends, with the aid of construc
tion trains that carried the needed materials.
cation would be restored very

^8

quickly.

^Sherman, Memoirs, pp. 398-399.

In this way, rail communi

The final measure of the system
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for protecting the railroads was the fortification of key towns and cities.
By June, 1864, Chattanooga, for example, was protected by sixteen earth
works ranging from redoubts and forts to batteries and lunettes.39
Next to the railroads, Sherman relied on steamboats to carry supplies
in bulk.

Even though the average Ohio River steamer could carry 500 tons,

this form of transportation was hampered by the seasonal hazards of low
water and ice.

During the siege of Chattanooga by Confederate forces,

General Grant appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Lewis B. Parsons as Chief Quar
termaster of Western River Transportation with headquarters in St. Louis.
Parsons immediately instituted administrative improvements in the handling
of river transportation which allowed the surprisingly low number of 66
steamboats to supply Grant's troops during the winter of 1863-64.43

With

the coming of spring, Parsons introduced changes in the system of charter
ing steamboats which saved the government an estimated $3,000,000.

Thus,

from February to May, 1864, exactly 158,016 tons of freight were trans
ported quickly and efficiently to Nashville on 614 steamboats and barges.43
These supplies were eventually transported by rail to Sherman's troops and
contributed enormously to their success in the Atlanta Campaign.
After the reestablishment of railroad communication with Chattanooga,
few provisions were shipped there on the Tennessee River, because of the
difficulties involved in unloading supplies downriver from the impassable
Muscle Shoals of northern Alabama and then reloading them upriver on dif
ferent vessels in order to complete the trip to Chattanooga.

39OR,
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Nevertheless,

a boatyard was setup at Bridgeport, which is above Muscle Shoals, and the
construction of steamers and gunboats was begun,

Lieutenant-Commander

Le Roy Fitch of the Navy and Captain Arthur Edwards, Army assistant quar
termaster, were put in charge of the operation.

The Quartermaster Depart

ment was responsible for procuring the iron-plating, timber, and machinery,
and the laborers and mechanics were hired in the North.
in delivering materials,

Despite delays

the 4 gunboats, each named after a Union gen

eral, were completed by mid-July and turned over to the Navy for operation.
They were used to patrol the Upper Tennessee to Knoxville and to protect
supply depots along the river.

In addition to the gunboats, 13 steamers

were built which transported limited quantities of supplies back and forth
from Chattanooga to Knoxville.^2

Though not as valuable overall as the

railroads, steamboats and gunboats were important to Sherman in transport
ing supplies and keeping the rivers open as lines of communication.
The final means of transporting supplies to Sherman's troops was by
wagon train.

Since the Quartermaster Department controlled the transpor

tation of the Army, wagons and the animals to pull them came under its juris
diction.

At the beginning of the war, army wagons were pulled either by

mules or by horses. It was soon realized that horses were not fit for such
strenuous service, and thereafter mules were used exclusively.

On a good

road in good weather, a team of 6 mules could pull 4,000 pounds of cargo,
but the average was only 2,500 pounds.

The payload could include forage, bag

gage, rations, hospital stores, and ammunition. For example, the regulation
42
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wagon could carry 1,400 marching rations, eight days grain for the mules,
or 25 boxes of infantry ammunition.

Throughout the early years of the

war, wagons were divided into headquarters, regimental, and general sup
ply trains.

The first two tended to carry baggage, and the latter trans

ported rations, ammunition, and the remaining provisions necessary for
field service but too heavy to be conveyed any other way.

The general

supply trains fluctuated greatly in terms of size and tended to increase
as supply lines

lengthened.

When the war began, 6 wagons were allotted

to each regiment of infantry, but by 1864, this number had been reduced
to 2.

Sherman was very much aware that the Army's marches had frequently

been hindered by too many wagons and too much baggage.

In preparation

for the Atlanta Campaign, he took strict measures to solve this nagging
problem.^
Sherman was not one to put limitations on what his men carried with
out doing likewise himself.

In setting an example for his troops, he

announced:

My entire headquarters transportation is one wagon for myself, aides,
clerks, and orderlies. I think that this is as lowdown as we can get until
we get flat broke, and thenceforward things will begin to mend. Soldier
ing as we have been doing for the last 2 years, with such trains and imped
iments, has been a farce, and nothing but absolute poverty will cure it.^

For the campaign, each regiment was limited to 1 wagon for baggage and 1
ambulance for transporting the wounded.

The typical contents of a regi

mental baggage wagon were included in a circular from Brigadier-General

^Risch, Quartermaster Support, pp. 420-424.
p. 39.
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William B. Hazen of the Army of the Cumberland to his unit;

During the coming campaign but one wagon will be allowed each regiment.
In this must be carried 10 days' forage for the team and horses of offi
cers, and such cooking utensils and officers' blankets and clothing as
are indispensable. Officers will at once see that there are no trunks,
mess-chests, or boxes carried, except 1 box for each regiment, in which
there must be blanks and stationery sufficient to make the required com
pany and regimental reports and returns, which in the future will be
required on the march.^

In addition, the officers of a company of infantry were allowed 1 packmule
to transport their personal possessions.
Individual soldiers and officers could carry only clothing, food, and
ammunition on themselves.

James F. Hedley, adjutant of an Indiana infantry

regiment, detailed the equipment of the private soldier:

Each man carried his gun and accoutrements, forty rounds of ammunition in
his cartridge-box, and one hundred and sixty more in his pockets, knapsack,
or haversack. His blanket and light rubber blanket were made into a long
roll, the ends tied together, so as to admit of being carried upon the
shoulder. This roll generally contained an extra shirt, a pair of socks,
and a half-section of a 'dog tent,' or piece of light ducking, which, when
buttoned to the half carried by a comrade, made a very fair shelter for
two men. Occasionally a soldier carried an extra pair of pants or an over
coat, but this evidence of extravagence was regarded with contempt by most
of the men. Knapsacks were often discarded entirely. The provision issued
to the soldier was a much abridged ration, but it brought up the total
weight of his burden to good thirty pounds, or more, no light load to carry
for days at a time, in all weather, and over all kinds of road. He habit
ually had a three days' supply of hardbread and fat pork, and this was to
last from seven to ten days in case of necessity.^

Hedley's "much abridged ration" was what the Army called the marching or
short ration.

For one man for one day, it consisted of 12 ounces of pork

^William B. Hazen, A Narrative of Military Service (Boston;
and Company, 1885), p. 247.
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or bacon, or 22 ounces of salted or fresh beef, 16 ounces of army or hard
bread, and a few ounces of coffee.

By the Army's calculation, this was

all that a soldier needed while on the march.^

The allowances concerning

transportation discussed above pertained only to infantry units.

Unlike

the cavalry and the artillery, which usually had ample transportation be
cause of the very nature of their equipment and service, the infantry walked
everywhere and therefore had to be allotted its transportation carefully.
The excess baggage that was eliminated from the marching columns was delivered to camps set up near Chattanooga specifically for storage purposes.49
Headquarters units were allowed only 1 tent, which was usually a walltent fly that had to be erected on poles cut from the woods at the end of
the day's march, and no tent furniture.^0

General George H. Thomas, who

commanded the Army of the Cumberland, was the only senior officer who did
not follow these orders.

He indulged in an elaborate headquarters arrange

ment with many large tents.

To soldiers and officers alike, Thomas' head

quarters was known sarcastically as Pap Thomas' Travelling Circus.

In

preparing for the Atlanta Campaign, Sherman's armies were so well provi
sioned that he doubted "if any army ever went forth to battle with fewer
impedimenta, and where the regular and necessary supplies of food, ammuni
tion, and clothing were issued, as called for, so regularly and so well."51
The network which allowed Sherman's legions to be so well supplied
was the depot system.

4^Army
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depot or base of operations, which is defined as a "place accessible to
transportation to the front and rear, and sufficiently remote from the battle
52
areas to be relatively secure from hostile action." ~

The city's logis

tical facilities were organized by General Robert Allen.

Louisville was

set up to function as a funnel, through which all supplies from the North
passed on their way down the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to the next
base.
The main supply depot for the armies in the field and the next stop
on the railroad was Nashville.

This city was turned into avast warehouse

by Lieutenant-Colonel Donaldson.

It was equipped with enormous storage

facilities, so that it alone could sustain Sherman for six months should
communications with Louisville be severed.53
Serviced by the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, Chattanooga was
the location of the advance depot.

Here, under the direction of Lieutenant-

Colonel Easton,12 warehouses were built.

In these structures, provisions

54
were temporarily accumulated before being sent to the fighting front.
The last stop along the rialroad for supplies was the string of tem
porary and field depots.

These were set up on the railroad as close to

the front line as possible.

Here provisions were transferred to army wag

ons which delivered them to the soldiers in the trenches.

When the army

would advance, a temporary depot could either be moved with the troops or

"^Huston, "Logistical," p. 36.
53Risch, Quartermaster Support, p. 430.
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left to function as a field depot which served to facilitate the forward
movement of supplies.

The first temporary depot for the Union Army in the

Atlanta Campaign was located at Ringgold, Georgia on the Western and Atlan
tic Railroad.

When Sherman took his army farther south, Ringgold was con

verted to a field depot and remained in operation throughout the campaign.
As commanding officer of the military division, Sherman retained ultimate
control of all depots in order to insure the smooth operation of his logis
tical support.55
By the time the campaign began, the depot system had allowed an incred
ible accumulation of supplies.

At Jeffersonville, Indiana, just across

the Ohio River from Louisville, 10,000,000 rations were stored.56

At

Nashville alone, "five months' supplies of all kinds"57 were stockpiled,
which included rations enough for 150,000men and 60,000 animals.58

Also

at Nashville were facilities for packing hogs and pickles, and bakeries
that used 550 barrels of flour daily.56 Likewise, the warehouses of Chat
tanooga bulged with the mass of supplies that arrived there.

A total of

100,000 rations for thirty days and clothing to last six months arrived
before the commencement of the march against Atlanta.66 With such a reserve
of provisions, Sherman resolved to keep twenty days' supply of rations in
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his wagons at all times.This precaution was taken so that the troops
could remain supplied even if Confederate cavalry raids or a railroad acci
dent should cut communications with the depots in the rear.
The final link in Sherman's logistical chain was the medical service.
To remove wounded soldiers from the field, the Ambulance Corps was created
in March, 1864.

It was run by soldiers detailed solely for that duty. The

ambulances were two-wheeled vehicles which could hold 10 to 16 soldiers.
They were supplied and maintained by the Quartermaster Department.

Ambu

lances could carry nothing but the wounded and medical supplies, and no
r

9

one but Ambulance Corps personnel could assist the wounded.
As with the quartermaster department, the medical departments of the
three armies operated separately.

Each maintained its own hospitals and

hospital trains, furnished its own medical supplies, and transported its
own wounded from field hospitals to army general hospitals in the rear.
The hospitals of the Army of the Tennessee were located in Rome and Marietta,
Georgia.

The one at Rome had 3,000 beds, while the other at Marietta had

full laundry and kitchen facilities.

As in other logistical areas, the

Army of the Cumberland was the best equipped medically, with several well
supplied hospitals in Chattanooga and Nashville.

When it came to medical

aid, the soldiers of the Army of the Ohio fared the worst.

Only after

their wounded were told there was no room for them in the army hospitals
in Chattanooga did they establish one of their own in Knoxville.

^Huston, "Logistical," p. 42.
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As the campaign progressed, a general hospital to accommodate the
wounded of all the armies was set up first at Allatoona, Georgia and then
moved to Marietta.

Hospital trains conveyed the wounded to the rear. First,

they were taken daily to designated collection points along the Western
and Atlantic Railroad.

Sometimes, empty boxcars would transport the men,

but more often than not, passenger cars converted so that the wounded
fill

could be treated enroute were used.4
The efforts of Sherman's quartermaster officers to accumulate rations
for the campaign were a tremendous success.

During the winter of 1863-64,

however, the food available directly to the troops was not always abundant.
According to Surgeon Edward D. Kittoe, Medical Inspector for Sherman, "scurvy
6s
naturally prevailed to some extent in most regiments."

In the majority

of cases, the condition was mild, and during the last few weeks before the
campaign, "vegetables were issued free"^ to clear it up. The serious cases
were sent to the rear until they could recover and rejoin their units. For
the most part, however, medical officers reported the soldiers to be in
67

excellent health and eagerly awaiting the opening of hostilities.

By May 5, the Union forces under Sherman totalled 98,797 troops and
254 artillery pieces,^8
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mules, 5,180 wagons, and 860

ambulances

,69 jn order to lead his enormous

army effectively, Sherman moyed his headquarters to Chattanooga and pre
pared to take the field and command his troops personally.7^

To travel

with him in the field, he appointed a personal staff of six high ranking
officers:

Brigadier-General William F. Barry as Chief of Artillery, Cap

tain Orlando M. Poe as Chief Engineer, Lieutenant-Colonel Langdon C. Easton
as Chief Quartermaster, Brigadier-General Amos Beckwith as Chief Commis
sary, Captain Thomas G. Baylor as Chief of Ordnance, and Surgeon Edward D.
Kittoe as Medical Inspector.7-*-

To relieve him of the tedium of paperwork,

Sherman located his general headquarters at Nashville.

But at all times,

he was connected with his office by telegraph so that he could respond
immediately to any developments at the front or in the rear.72
With all the preparations that went into readying William T. Sherman's
three armies grouped near Chattanooga for the Atlanta Campaign, it appeared
that nothing could go wrong with the logistical system.

Fortunately for

the war effort and thus the restoration of the Union, nothing did. However,
should some mishap have caused him to be separated from his sources of sup
ply, Sherman harbored no illusions concerning feeding his troops.

He had

carefully studied the returns of the Census of 1860 and tax documents compiled by the Comptroller of the State of Georgia,73 and as he wrote to a

69Major, Supply of, p. 102.
•^Sherman, Memoirs, pp. 30-31.
710R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 23-24.

^Sherman, Memoirs, p. 31.
73Ibid.
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fellow officer in early 1864, "when the provisions, forage, horses, mules,
wagons, etc., are used by the enemy, it is clearly our duty and right to
take them also, because otherwise they might be used against us."^

With

seven months of preparation behind them, Sherman's troops moved out of
their camps on the morning of May 5, 1864 to challenge Joseph E. Johnston's
Confederate Army of Tennessee for supremacy in Georgia.

^Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed., The Sherman Letters; Correspondence
Between General and Senator Sherman From 1837 to 1891 (New York; Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1894), p. 230. Hereinafter cited as Thorndike, Sherman
Letters.

CHAPTER III
"SIR, I GIVE YOU 48 HOURS OR A POSITION IN THE FRONT RANKS,"
MAY 5 - MAY 23, 1864

General Grant's orders for the part that Sherman's armies would play
in the multiple Union offensives of 1864 came in early April. "You I
propose to move against Johnston's army," he wrote, "to break it up, and
to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflict
ing all the damage you can against his war resources.To carry out his
mission, Sherman had at his disposal the Union Armies of the Cumberland,
the Tennessee, and the Ohio, under Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield,
respectively. These troops were located at various points on the roads from
Chattanooga to the Confederate winter camp at Dalton. Thomas' Cumberlanders
were encamped around the small town of Ringgold, on the railroad about
sixteen miles south of Chattanooga. McPherson's troops were situated on
the Chickamauga battlefield at Lee and Gordon's Mill on Chickamauga Creek.
Among these soldiers was Major-General Joseph Hooker's Twentieth Corps of
the Army of the Cumberland.

Near the Georgia-Tennessee border, Schofield's

Army of the Ohio was positioned. (See Map 2 on page 33 for movements of
armies from May 5 - May 23, 1864.)
In preparation for the campaign, Johnston ordered the construction of
defensive lines composed of elaborate

earthworks and located them on advan

tageous ground south of his initial line at Rocky Face Ridge, astride the
Western and Atlantic Railroad a few miles south of Dalton. Sherman planned
to use his largest army, that of Thomas, to entrench in front of Johnston's

1 Sherman, Memoirs, p. 26.

MAP 2. Prepared at the Coast Survey
Office, Washington, D. C. Sept. 1864
Page 53
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positions and thus hold the Confederates in place.

At the same time,

Schofield's and McPherson's armies would threaten the flanks of the Army
of Tennessee, hopefully forcing it out of its stronghold, or cutting its
railroad supply lines, or both.^

In order to maintain the Union line of

supply, the Construction Corps of the United States Military Railroad would
repair the Western and Atlantic as the Federals progressed southward. By
the end of the campaign, the Union supply line

totalled four hundred and
O

seventy-two miles of railroad from Atlanta to Louisville.
With his forces poised and ready for action and his plan in mind,
Sherman gave the signal for the campaign to begin on May 5, and his armies
marched south to confront the Confederates at Rocky Face. The advance to
this natural mountain fortress was by two routes.

Schofield approached by

way of Red Clay, Georgia, approximately ten miles north of Rocky Face.
Thomas followed the course of the railroad from Ringgold to Tunnel Hill.
From May 7-9, unsuccessful demonstrations were made against Johnston's
superbly constructed trenches. While this action was taking place, the
railroad was repaired as far as Tunnel Hill, where trains arrived on May 9.4
Here the tracks passed through a ridge by means of a tunnel which gave
rise to the name of the town.

On first sight, W. W. Wright, head of the

Construction Corps, admitted that "fears being entertained by some that
the tunnel had been mined by the enemy, a locomotive was run through it

2jaCob D. Cox, Atlanta Campaigns of the Civil War, Vol IX (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882), p. 50. Hereinafter cited as Cox, Atlanta.
%eber, Northern, p. 199.
4Sherman,

Memoirs, p. 32. OR 1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 56, 104.
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to test the matter, but it was found to be all safe."5
Sherman hoped to meet Johnston in the decisive battle of the
campaign in the vicinity of Tunnel Hill,^ but the Southerner would not
oblige.

Thus an alternative had to be sought, because a frontal assault

on Rocky Face would be disastrous for Sherman.

One possibility lay in a

move that was already under way. While the fighting at Rocky Face was in
progress, McPherson was leading his troops through Snake Creek Gap to
attempt to cut the Western and Atlantic at Resaca, a small railroad village
fifteen miles south of Johnston's Rocky Face position.

Hopefully, this

maneuver would force the Confederates to retreat to the Oostanaula River
in order to preserve their supply line from Atlanta.

When McPherson's

advance units skirmished with a Confederate cavalry brigade, he ordered
his whole command to retreat into the gap, thinking that the enemy was in
full force before him and claiming that provisions were too low to continue
on.7
With his assaults at Rocky Face blunted and McPherson stalled in
Snake Creek Gap, Sherman formulated a new plan for forcing Johnston to
retreat southward. He proposed to leave Major-General Oliver Otis Howard's
Fourth Corps of Thomas' army and some cavalry units to launch a diversionary
attack on Buzzard Roost Gap, where the railroad passed through the mountains
next to Rocky Face Ridge, in order to pin down the main Confederate force
ensconced on its craggy slopes.

50R,

3, V. p. 951.

60R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 70.

7Ibid.,

p. 106.

At the same time, the rest of Thomas'
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troops and Schofield's army would join McPherson in Snake Creek Gap and
march directly eastward and sever the Western and Atlantic at

Resaca.^

In order to accomplish this goal, detailed arrangements had to be made
concerning supplies. According to orders issued to Wright on May 11,
Cars will be run here [Tunnel Hill] to supply the daily wants of the
troops left here, but the main portion of the supplies will be left at
Ringgold, which point will be defended at all costs. In case the enemy
should detect the diminution of force here and attack, it has instructions
to withdraw in the direction of Ringgold. You will keep a locomotive and
construction train at this place, so that in case this retrograde movement
becomes necessary, you can take up rails at intervals, so as to make a re
pair train necessary to replace them; this that the enemy may not use the
railroad to facilitate his movement in pursuit. A few rails should at
once be removed from some point east of the tunnel, that can again be put
down when we want it done.9

In addition, a construction train was sent to Varnell's Station on
the Georgia Railroad which connected Dalton, on the Western and Atlantic,
to East Tennessee. Rails were taken up and shipped back to Chattanooga in
order to prevent the Confederates from using this line to support a march
against Chattanooga while Sherman's troops were pushing through Snake Creek
Gap.With

the safety of the railroad provided for, Sherman began to

improve the road through Snake Creek Gap so it could accommodate the thou
sands of soldiers, wagons, and animals that would use it.
Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox, one of Schofield's division commanders,
described the pass as "a wild and picturesque defile, five or six miles
long.

Hardly a cabin was to be seen in its whole length.

The road was

only such a track as country wagons had worn in the bed of the stream or

^Ibid., pp. 113-114.
^Ibid., p. 138.
l^Ibid., p. 123.
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along the foot of the mountain."11

Major-General Daniel Butterfield's

division of Hooker's Twentieth Corps was equipped with axes and shovels
and sent to work on the road.

They were to widen it so that wagon traffic

could travel in both directions.
speed to the front.

In this way, supplies would move with

Also, paths were cleared along the edge of the road

so that infantry could march without getting in the way of the wagons.1^
With this overland supply route now capable of meeting the needs of the
troops, the quartermasters issued ten days' rations to the armies,^ and
the decisive move to capture Resaca began.
Johnston was informed of the presence of the bulk of Sherman's troops
within a few miles of Resaca by Confederate detachments in the vicinity.
He quickly withdrew the Army of Tennessee from Rocky Face on May 13 and
deployed it in defensive positions on the north side of the Oostanaula
River, just outside Resaca.

There he was joined by advance elements of

Lieutenant-General Leonidas K. Polk's Army of Mississippi which had been
summoned

by Confederate President Jefferson Davis to help Johnston turn

back the Union forces in northern Georiga.

The Confederate retreat from

Dalton was so quick that the railroad could not be destroyed.

Advancing

south through Dalton, General Howard's Fourth Corps secured the railroad
as far as Tilton, six miles north of Resaca.

The track was in such good

shape that the Construction Corps was able to repair it to Dalton on May 13

11Cox,
120R,

Atlanta, pp. 35-36.

1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 113-114, 116.

1^James

A. Connolly, Three years in the Army of the Cumberland
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 207. Hereinafter cited
as Connolly, Three Years.
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and to Tilton two days later, a distance of twelve miles from Tunnel Hill.^
Dalton was immediately converted into the new field depot in order
to provide a place closer to the front than Ringgold for stockpiling

pro

visions and loading them on wagons to be sent directly to the troops. As
a result, Snake Creek Gap was abandoned as a supply line, but it had pro
vided a vital, natural passage through the mountains for troops and
supplies.

Without such a route, the flanking maneuver that forced

Johnston back from Rocky Face would not have been possible; thus, a direct
assault on the original Confederate mountain fortress at Rocky Face might
have been necessary.

Because of the high priority given cars loaded with

ammunition, these were sent forward on the railroad to "the very rear of
the army.The work of the Construction and Transportation Corps was
so efficient throughout the campaign that trains would arrive very near the
front, usually within hours of the arrival of the troops.

The resulting

boost in the morale of the Union soldiers was tremendous, and as one
Federal general maintained, "perhaps nothing produced more moral effect
upon the enemy than hearing the whistle of the locomotives in the rear
of the lines."I?
Beginning on May 13, the Union troops spent three days in assaulting
Johnston's lines protecting Resaca and the railroad bridge over the Oostanaula
River.

The Battle of Resaca ended in a stalemate.

During the course of

battle, Sherman decided to flank the Confederate position at Resaca by means

140R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 163, 189.

•^Ibid., p. 200.
l6Ibid.

l^Cox, Atlanta, p. 61.
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of a pontoon bridge across the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry, a natural crossing
several miles downriver near the town of Calhoun. On May 14, two bridges
were put down at the ferry under the supervision of Captain C. B. Reese,
Cheif Engineer of the Army of the Tennessee.-*-8

As a result, Johnston

abandoned his positions that night and withdrew across the Oostanaula,
destroying the railroad bridge as he left.
During the next day, elements of McPherson's army skirmished with
Confederates who tried to contest the crossing.

The defense of the ferry

was successful, and by May 17 all of McPherson's troops were on the south
side of the Oostanaula.

In the meantime, Thomas had crossed on three

improvised bridges at the railroad crossing, and Schofield was over the
Coosawatee River east of Resaca, at Fite's and Field's

Ferries.19

Upon

their arrival in Resaca on May 16, the Federals found the remains of
Johnston's hasty withdrawal.
left behind were captured.

Subsistence stores, artillery, and small-arms

Work on the railroad began immediately, and

trains arrived in Resaca the same day.

The town was designated as the

new advance depot, and all empty wagons returning from the front were
directed there to pick up their next load of supplies.2^

Before the

campaign could continue, the railroad bridge over the Oostanuala had to
be virtually rebuilt, and in this task, the first real challenge to Wright
and the men of his Construction Corps was presented.

l®Ibid.,

p. 46. Sherman, Memoirs, p. 35.

19QR,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 219. J. Willard Brown, The Signal Corps, U.S.A.
in the War of the Rebellion (Boston: U.S. Veteran Signal Corps Association,
1896)7 p7~524.
20OR,

1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 216, 218.
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Just after the last Confederates crossed the Oostanaula on May 15,
advance units of the Union forces arrived and were followed so quickly by
Construction Corps workers that the work to rebuild the bridge began immedi
ately.

This effort, however, "was somewhat delayed because the iron rods

were so hot that the men could not handle them to remove the wreck"2! that
obstructed the track.

After assessing the damage to the bridge, Wright

estimated that it would require four days to repair.

Sherman replied, "Sir,

I give you 48 hours or a position in the front ranks."22
In an attempt to comply with Sherman's orders, Wright abandoned the
usual practice of drawing on pre-cut bridge timber stockpiled in the rear
of the army.

Instead, timber "was cut in the vicinity and sent by rail to

the framers and raisers at the site, the work being done from both ends"22
of the bridge.

It took Wright's men seventy-two hours to complete the

work, and Sherman forgave the engineer for taking an extra day.

The first

important obstacle to extending the life-sustaining railroad and continuing
to use it as the principal means of supply had been overcome in an amazingly
short period of time, and once again, the blare of locomotive whistles
was heard near the front.
While the Oostanaula railroad bridge was being mended, several events
of importance took place.

After the Oostanaula line was given up, the

Confederates retreated first to Adairsville, which they in turn abandoned on
May 18, and withdrew to Cassville, seven miles north of the Etowah River
and on the Western and Atlantic Railroad.

210R,

There Johnston was prepared to

3, IV, p. 957. OR, 3, V, p. 951.

22Weber,

22Ibid,

Northern, p. 201.

pp. 202-203.
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fight, but after consultation with two of his corps commanders who were
opposed to the idea, he decided to retreat again.

On the night of May 19,

the Army of Tennessee crossed the Etowah and took up a defensive position
in the Allatoona Mountains overlooking the river.

In the meantime, the

town of Rome, located at the confluence of the Etowah and Oostanaula Rivers
and downstream

from Resaca, was occuppied.

The quantity of stores captured

there was enough to subsist its Federal garrison for two weeks.As soon
as Sherman's troops arrived at the Etowah, they found the railroad over
it destroyed, but the Confederates left intact the stone pillars which
would greatly facilitate the rebuilding of the bridge. In the haste of
their retreat, the Confederates had neglected to destroy all of the regular
bridges over the river, and soon the Union troops located and secured the
unguarded crossings.
Now fifteen days into the campaign, Sherman's bluecoats had pushed
back their counterparts in gray a total of fifty-three miles, over half
the distance from Rocky Face Ridge to Atlanta.

In so doing, the Federal

forces had secured crossings of two major rivers and had put nearly fifty
miles of track back in working order, including repairing one large rail
road bridge.

After all this effort, Sherman decided to give his troops a

rest on May 20 before marching farther. During this time, "the railroad
was repaired and pressed to its utmost capacity to accumulate supplies."^6
On the same day, the railroad was repaired to Kingston.
line ran thirteen miles to Rome.

2Z*0R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 264.

^Ibid., pp. 250, 257-258.
2^Cox, Atlanta, p. 58.

There a branch

Resaca was retained as the advance depot,
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but in anticipation of future needs, Kingston was garrisoned by 1,000 men
from the Army of the Cumberland.

Supplies were loaded onto army wagons

at Resaca and transported to Kingston and Rome, where they were stockpiled
for the next advance.

In addition, the track was repaired an extra five

miles to Cass Station, near the village of Cassville, but trains did not
travel farther south than Kingston.27
Toward the end of the advance that ended at the Etowah River, the
Federals were several miles ahead of their railroad service, and consequently,
rations began to run low.

With the railroad now repaired to the immediate

rear of the troops, provisions to last for twenty days were issued to each
division for the next march.28

gy May 22, with his railroad in good order

and his troops reprovisioned, Sherman discussed his plans by letter with
his brother, Senator John Sherman:

We occupy Rome, Kingston, and Cassville. I have repaired the railroad
to these points and now have ordered the essential supplies forward to
replenish our wagons, when I will make for Atlanta, fifty-nine miles from
here and about fifty from the advance. Johnston has halted across the
Etowah at a place called Allatoona, where the railroad and common road
passes [sic] through a spur of the mountain, making one of those formidable
passes which gives an army on the defensive so much advantage, but I propose
to cross the Etowah here and go to Marietta via Dallas. 29

Several aspects of protecting Sherman's ever extending supply line
were crucial to his success thus far.

As the Federals advanced and the

Confederates withdrew, Johnston "was picking up his detachments as he fell
back," Sherman explained, "whereas I was compelled to make similar and

270R, 1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 288. OR 3, V, p. 951.
28Cox,

Atlanta, pp. 59-60, 63. Sherman, Memoirs, p. 38.

29Thorndike,

Sherman Letters, pp. 234-235.
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stronger detachments to repair the railroads as we advanced, and to guard
them.-30 In addition, with the arrival of Polk's army, Johnston had three
infantry corps under his command with a combined strength of approximately
65,000.

In order to insure the better protection of the Western and At

lantic and the Nashville and Chattanooga, the backbone of Sherman's supply
system, the duty of guarding all this track was given to General Thomas in
mid-May.31

The decision was made with the knowledge that Thomas' command,

the Army and Department of the Cumberland, numbered roughly 100,000 troops
and was therefore far more capable of performing the extra duty than either
of the smaller Departments of the Ohio or the Tennessee.
Guerillas were another vexing problem for the Federals.

Raids by

guerillas were far more frequent than those by regular Confederate cavalry.
Usually they were not serious enough to stop the flow of supplies, but
frequent interruptions were almost a daily occurrence. Concerning attacks
on the railroad lines, Superintendent McCallum of the United States Military
Railroad referred to the Western and Atlantic as being "more infested with
guerillas than any other line during the war."^ Frequently, a few rails
were taken up in order to derail a construction or supply train and other
railroad workers were shot at.33
guerilla

activity.

Supply wagons were also the object of

During the morning of May 24, a wagon train near Cass-

ville was attacked and "some twenty wagons burned, and about the same number

•^Sherman, Memoirs, p. 39.
310R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 188, 216-217.

32OR, 3, V, p. 584.
33OR,

1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 259, 275.
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driven

off

."34 The action was attributed to Major-General Joseph Wheeler's

Confederate cavalry corps serving under Johnston, but it is just as likely
that the raid was carried out by irregular, partisan cavalry that constantly
lurked around the Union supply routes, looking for an opportunity to strike.35
Later in the campaign, Sherman authorized retaliatory measures against the
guerillas which were brutal.
Another recurrent problem for Sherman was that of forage for his
animals.

The grain ration for the horses and mules was provided primarily

by the railroad, but almost all the hay and even some of the grain had to
be requisitioned directly from local farms.

Cavalry commanders especially

were constant in their demands for more forage, because their units were
often separated from the regular supply

36

sources.

The hay, as well as

any other item needed by the Army which could not be provided by its own
supply network, or anything that would be of use to the Confederates,
might be taken by detachments under the direct supervision of

37

officers.

Though abuses were few, they did occur from time to time and were as much
abhorred by the Army as by the populace.

For example, Brigadier-General

Milo S. Hascall, a division commander in Schofield's army, was shocked at
the sight of "houses and barns on fire."33

With the exception of hay,

the overwhelming bulk of the regular supplies for Sherman's soldiers during

34Ibid.,

pp.

303-304, 306.

35Ibid.
36Ibid.,

pp. 85, 207, 219, 249.

3^Ibid., p. 291.
38ibid.,

pp.

297-298.
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the Atlanta Campaign was furnished by the United States Military Railroad
and the Quartermaster Department. In fact, while visiting the Union troops
in the field in Georgia, Brigadier-General Robert Allen, Chief Quarter
master of the Military Division of the Mississippi, was assured by Sherman
(

that "no army in the world was ever better provided.

OQ

Thus,with their

supply wagons replenished, Sherman's troops took up the line of march again
on May 23.

39jbid.f

p. 299.

CHAPTER IV
"IT BEATS ALL HOW MUCH IT RAINS HERE,"
MAY 23 - JULY 17, 1864

Sherman decided to march to Dallas, which is approximately thirty miles
northwest of Atlanta, for two reasons.

First, he intended to use the

town as a springboard, from which to threaten both Marietta and Atlanta
at the same time.

Second, and more importantly, the movement was designed

to menace Johnston's left flank and force him to withdraw from the Allatoona
Mountains in order to preserve his lines of supply and communication.^
The area around Dallas was generally poor agriculturally and densely wood
ed, with few good roads. Since Sherman was leaving behind the railroad and
the depot at Kingston, he depended on the twenty days' rations in his supply
wagons.2

(See Map 3 on Page 67 for movements of armies

from May 23 -

July 17, 1864.)
Beginning on May 25, three days of sharp fighting began around New
Hope Church, a small community a few miles north of Dallas.

And with this

action came the rain that would dominate all the movements of the Union
and Confederate forces for the next month.

In just a few days, the roads

became nearly impassable, and their condition was worsened by the constant
movement of wagons and animals.

According to one Union soldier from a

New York infantry regiment, "the wagons would sink in the mud up to their
axles and they could not be moved by the mules alone. The men had to take
a hand, pry up the wheels and corduroy [which means to lay down logs

"'"Sherman, Memoirs, p. 43.
^Ibid., p. 42.

MAP 3. Prepared at the Coast Survey
Office, Washington, D. C. Sept. 1864
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crosswise to form a road] the road to solid ground."3 It quickly became
obvious that the maneuver to outflank the Confederate position at Allatoona
needed to be completed as soon as possible, before the roads would no longer
support the supply wagons.^
By removing divisions from his right, marching them behind the front
line, and placing them back in line on his left, Sherman sidestepped his
way toward the Western and Atlantic south of Allatoona.

Thus one June 1,

Union troops reached the railroad at Acworth, a few miles south of the
Allatoona Pass.

In the meantime, Johnston withdrew his Confederates south

to a long range of hills known as Brush Mountain, just north of Kennesaw
Mountain.

From there, he extended his line southwestward ten miles to Lost

Mountain.

The first Federal units to occupy Allatoona Pass were the troop

ers of Brigadier-General Kenner Garrard's cavalry division of Thomas' army.
Garrard reported to Sherman that "the wagon bridge and the railroad bridge
at this point are both burnt."5

With the Allatoona Pass captured, Sherman's

march by way of Dallas back to the railroad was completed, and orders were
immediately issued to repair the railroad bridge over the Etowah River and to
•»

extend the track to Big Shanty, where the Federal advance ended on June 9.6
The march to Dallas and beyond was a very trying experience for
Sherman's soldiers.

The result was an outbreak of discipline problems,

straggling, and destruction of private property.

Major James A. Connolly

3Rice C. Bull, Soldiering: The Civil War Diary of Rice C. Bull, 123rd
New York Volunteer Infantry, ed. K. Jack Bauer (San Rafael, California.
Presidio Press, 1977), p. 122.
^Cox, Atlanta, p. 93.
50R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 387.

^Sherman, Memoirs, p. 46.
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of the 123rd Illinois infantry wrote to his wife that the behavior of some
soldiers "had degenerated into the most outrageous pillaging, but not in
the presence of officers."''
to correct this situation.

Immediate and successful measures were taken
From his headquarters near Dallas on June 4,

Sherman issued Special Field Orders Number 17 which declared that "the
only proper fate of such miscreants is that they be shot as common enemies
to their profession and country, and all officers and patrols sent to arrest
Q

them will shoot them without mercy on the slightest impudence or resistance."
No soldiers were ever shot in accordance with these instructions, but their
issuance illustrates an integral part of Sherman's character.

That is,

he endured hardship stoically during the fighting around Dallas, and his
soldiers were expected to do likewise.

The reason for the desertion and

pillaging was the supply problems created by the intense and continuing
rain.
Though Sherman's armies began the march to Dallas with a stockpile of
twenty days' rations, not all of it could be carried at once in the wagons.
When the rains came, the regular transportation of supplies to the front
was hindered.

The men never went hungry for any extended period of time,

but they did not have the usual amount of food.

The quartermasters kept

the meat ration up to specifications by driving along beef cattle which
could be slaughtered on the spot, but bread was in short supply in some
camps.9

^Connolly, Three Years, p. 216.
80R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 406.

^Cox, Atlanta, p. 93.
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The animals, however, did suffer.

The old problem of forage was made

even worse by rain which delayed the arrival of grain.

Forced to turn to

local supplies which were inadequate in both quality and quantity, Union
officers complained that the animals of their commands were dying of starva
tion.

For example, Colonel Edward M. McCook, commanding a division of cavalry

in the Army of the Cumberland, reported the condition of his horses on June 2.
"The green wheat and leaves," he maintained, "the only food we can procure,
neither strengthens nor nourishes them.

I tell you their condition now

so that you may not rely upon the division as serviceable, for it certainly
is not."1-0

In order to correct the problem, the animals of all units were

allowed to graze on private property, and forage was gathered from local
farms to such an extent that for miles around no hay could be found. The
burning of houses and barnes reported by General Hascall, was the result
of soldiers who disobeyed orders to spare farmers' dwellings and outbuild
ings.

Some commands even seized from farmers mules and horses which were

given a governemt brand and distributed for use in the army.1-1-

Despite

the temporary shortages, Sherman's troops were still pleased with their
provisioning, and Major Connolly boasted that he was part of

an enormous

army, well fed, clad and armed, in the very heart of Dixie."12
The only way for Sherman to restore his supply line so that trains
once again would run virtually to the front lines was to rebuild the Etowah

10OR,

1, XXXVIII, 4, 387.

l-l-Ibid.
pp. 351, 397. Henry C. Morhous, Reminiscences of the 123rd
Regiment, N.Y.S.V.., Giving a Complete History of Its Three Years Service
in the War, (Greenwich, New York: People's Journal Book and Job Office,
1879)7 77"93.
!2connolly, Three Years, p. 218.

River railroad bridge.

Major-Gerieral George Stoneman, commanding one of

the cavalry divisions that seized the Allatoona Pass, sent word to Sherman
on June 2 stating that the railroad was undisturbed from the bridge as far
south as Acworth.

He also reported that the Confederates did not destroy

the bridge's stone

piers.13

Had they been demolished, it would have been

next to impossible to rebuild the span quickly.

By the morning of June 6,

Wright and all of his Construction Corps had arrived, and work began
immediately.

The trains sent to retrieve the bridging timber, prepared

earlier and stored along the railroads, were delayed.

In order to keep

the completion of the bridge on schedule, timber was cut nearby and dragged
to the site by hand and with the assistance of oxen which were provided
for that specific purpose by the Commissary Department. Despite the delays,
the bridge was completed at noon on June 11, five and one-half days after
it was begun.

The structure was six hundred feet long and sixty-seven feet

high, and and as soon as the track was clear, trains were run to Big Shanty,
on the railroad within sight of Kennesaw Mountain.1^
On the day the Etowah bridge was completed, an amusing incident
occurred involving the first train to arrive in Big Shanty.

The engine

was uncoupled from the cars, and the engineer decided to show the Confeder
ates that their attempt to delay the Federals by destroying the bridge was
not successful.

He ran the engine forward to a water tank very near the

skirmish line which was within range of the Confederate artillery.

i^OR, 1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 388.
14QR, 3, V, pp. 954, 959. L. H. Eicholtz, Division Engineer, United
States Military Railroad to Washington Townshend, June 27, 1864, in the
collection of the Atlanta Historical Society, Atlanta, Georgia. MS 101F
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According to one Union soldier, the engineer "tooted and tooted the whistle
for all it was worth.

You could hear the men cheer for miles."1^

whistle was answered by Confederate artillery.
drew water from the tank for his thirsty engine

The

The engineer, however, cooly
and withdrew, without once

being struck by the enemy's missiles.16
While the railroad bridge was being rebuilt, all supplies in Kingston
and Resaca were shipped to the Etowah and unloaded.

There they could be

transported quickly across the river on the new road bridge and later
placed in the depot under construction at Allatoona, while Resaca and
Kingston were discontinued as points of supply.

In the meantime, Major-

General Frank P. Blair's Seventeenth Corps, which had been guarding the
military railroads in northern Alabama, arrived at the Etowah River on
June 6.

A pontoon bridge was laid across the river, and the corps joined

Sherman's main force, while one of its brigades was detached to guard the
men working on the Allatoona depot.I7
Sherman left no doubt about the importance of the new supply center.
In a message to one of his division commanders he stressed: "I regard
Allatoona of the first importance in our future plans.

It is a second

To fortify the pass, earthen redoubts were built at its

Chattanooga.

eastern extremity under the direction of Captain 0. M. Poe, Sherman's

15Theodore

F. Upson, With Sherman to the Sea (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1958), p. 113. Hereinafter cited as Upson, With Sherman.
l^sherman, Memoirs, p. 51.
170R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 426, 427. Cox, Atlanta, p. 94.

180R,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 141.
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chief engineer.

In addition to the units assigned to the work, extra

laborers were gathered by arresting stragglers from the front line commands
and putting them to work on the redoubts.I9

jn mid-July, Brigadier-General

John E. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps arrived at Allatoona from
northern Alabama, where it too was assigned to railroad guard duty.

Rather

than being sent to the front, the division was split up and sent to garrison
90

not only Allatoona Pass but also other important railroad strongholds.

With his railroad supply route secure once again and repaired to his skir
mish line, Sherman was nearly ready to continue the campaign.
At the same time as the work progressed on Allatoona, Sherman created
the Military Division of the Etowah, under the command of Major-General
James B. Steedman.

It encompassed the territory from Bridgeport, Alabama

21

to Allatoona and included Cleveland, Tennessee and Rome, Georgia.

The

division was organized "so that the protection of Sherman s communications
might be systematized under a responsible head."22

Steedman's duties

included keeping railroad and telegraph communications open with the front
and shifting around the railroad garrisons to provide the best safety for
the track and the wires.

In addition, a reserve force was to be kept ready

to respond to an attack anywhere along the railroad.23

190R,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 427.

20Ibid.,

210R,

pp. 532, 543. OR, 1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 113.

1, XXXVIII, 4, 453.

22Cox,

Atlanta, p. 142.

23or, 1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 453.
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protection to the trains themselves, 1,000 men were detailed from MajorGeneral John M. Palmer's Fourteenth Corps to ride on the trains as guards.24
In addition to worrying about the possibility of Wheeler's cavalry or
guerilla

bands striking his railroads, Sherman also had to think about

neutralizing the highly successful Confederate cavalry command of General
Nathan Bedford Forrest.

From his camps in northern Mississippi, Forrest

was always a threat to cross the Tennessee River and break up the railroads
leading south from Nashville to Chattanooga.

Confederate President Jefferson

Davis and his military advisor, General Braxton Bragg, however, would not
allow Forrest the opportunity to strike Sherman's rail communications.
This mistaken decision resulted from the steady devotion of Davis to his
policy of defending all of the Confederacy's border with the North, rather
than concentrating his forces on the various Union armies operating against
the South.
summarized:

As one Civil War historian, George Edgar Turner, has so ably
"So, while Sherman worried and Forrest lunged against the

leash which held him off Sherman's extended line, Davis and Bragg huddled
over the corpse of the long-dead Mississippi defense and let Sherman press
on toward Atlanta."2-*
Sherman had already sent two Union cavalry expeditions to subdue
Forrest, but both were defeated.

Finally in mid-July, 1864, after the

abortive Red River Campaign, Major-General Andrew J. Smith was ordered
by Sherman to assemble two divisions, then serving in Louisiana, from the

2^Ibid., p. 544.
25George Edgar Turner, Victory Rode the Rails: The Strategic Place
of the Railroads in the Civil War (Westport, Conneticut. Greenwood Press,
Publishers, 1953)~P- 33°- Hereinafter cited as Turner, Victory.
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Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps.

With these troops, Smith marched into

Mississippi and defeated Forrest at Tupelo on July 14.26

Wheeler's

cavalry was busy in guarding Johnston's flanks and was not a threat either.
The guerillas, however, were as active as ever.
Guerilla raids on the Western and Atlantic occurred daily, and Steedman was constantly receiving urgent messages from his beleaguered railroad
garrison commanders.

For example, Colonel J. H. Moore, commanding the

garrison at Resaca, reported on June 19 that "fifteen cars, loaded with
forage, were burned, but not wholly destroyed. Engine not much damaged;
road slightly injured.
direction.

Rebels approached from the west; left in same

A force of fifty men, a large estimate.

of brigands.

Road will be clear.

It was a motley band

They captured 12 prisoners."2?

All

the breaks were small and quickly repaired by W. W. Wright's efficient
and hard-working Construction Corps.

The soldiers at the front lines

were aware of what was going on to the rear, and their contempt for such
irregular warfare is shown in a statement by Major Connolly of the 123rd
Illinois.

"I suppose," he wrote in a letter to his wife, "they imagine

their 'critter companies' are making havoc with our railroad line which
OO

supplies us with rations.

But all their efforts are futile."

After weeks of enduring constant harassment by partisan groups,
Sherman authorized severe and brutal measures for dealing with them. One

^Sherman, Memoris, p. 52.
2?OR,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 532.

28connolly, Three Years, p. 223.
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favorite tactic of the guerillas was to place an explosive torpedo, which
is similar to a modern land-mine, on the track to blow up a passing train.
Sherman sent specific instructions to General Steedman on how to handle
guerillas and other saboteurs:

The use of torpedos in blowing up our cars and the road after they are
in our possession, is simply malicious. It cannot alter the great problem,
but simply makes trouble. Now, if torpedos are found in the possession
of any enemy to our rear, you may cause them to be put on the ground and
tested by wagon-loads of prisoners, or if need be, citizens implicated in
their use. In like manner, if a torpedo is suspected on any part of the
road, order the point to be tested by a car-load of prisoners, or
citizens implicated, drawn by a long rope. Of course an enemy cannot
complain of his own traps.29

Steedman responded with a general order to provide better protection
for all means of supply transporation going to the front.

He authorized

the arrest and trial of any civilians found too close to the railroad
track or garrisons and also ordered patrols to check all track, bridges,
and tunnels on a daily basis. And finally, any body of guards accompany
ing supplies or equipment heading to the front could be augmented, if a
garrison commander felt that the force was not sufficient to protect its
30

charge.

Even with these additional measures, the attacks persisted.

Sherman was eventually driven to authorize the execution of captured guerillas.
On July 9, he declared: "Don't spare the rascals at work to destroy our road.
I approve the severest measures."31

Five days later, he ordered that "if

guerillas trouble the road.or wires between Kingston and Acworth, they

29OR,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 579.

30pbid., pp. 634-635.
310R,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 97.
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should be shot without

mercy."32

On June 9, two days before the Etowah railroad bridge was completed,
the Union forces began to advance again.
lated for the march.

Ten days' supplies were accumu

Beginning on June 12, for the first time during the

campaign, Sherman's three armies drew supplies from separate locations.
This move was made to achieve greater efficiency in delivering supplies
to the front lines.

The Army of the Tennessee drew its provisions from

the depot at Big Shanty, the Army of the Ohio from Allatoona, and the
Army of the Cumberland from

Acworth.33

From June 11-19, Sherman's troops took up the fight against Johnston's
men along the ten-mile long Brush Mountain - Lost Mountain line.

On the

nineteenth, the Confederates withdrew to the Kennesaw Mountain line which
was roughly five miles in length and in the shape of an arc, protecting
the town of Marietta and its depot.

The Federals were entrenched opposite

the entire length of the Confederate line.
Sherman at bay for two weeks.

Here, Johnston would hold

At Kennesaw, as had been the custom for

several weeks, the rain came down in torrents.

In a communique to

Washington on June 21, Sherman reported that "this is the nineteenth
day of rain, and the prospect of clear weather as far off as ever. The
roads are impassable, and fields and woods become quagmires after a few
wagons have crossed, yet we are at work all the

time."34

There were

several east-west roads directly behind Sherman's armies but very few northsouth thoroughfares which could be used to deliver supplies to those

-^Ibid., p. 141.
33or, 1, XXXVIII, 4, pp. 428, 466.
34ibid., p. 544.
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troops farthest from the railroad, that is, Thomas' right and Schofield's
army.

Consequently, routes to these units had to be improvised, and they

quickly became as useless from the effects of the rain as the original
roads.

The soldiers and animals of Sherman's armies never lacked the

essential supplies at Kennesaw; in fact, Sherman issued a special field
order on June 26 informing commanders that rations were being issued
"from 50 to 75 per cent over the effective

strength."35

But, the incessant

rain and poor road conditions did not allow an extension of the line
southward to flank Johnston's entrenched position

again.36

Grumbling

about the disagreeable weather, one Union soldier remarked:"It beats
all how much it rains

here."37

Opposing Johnston's Kennesaw position, Sherman placed McPherson's
army on the north end of the Union line on the low range of hills known
as Brush Mountain, directly opposite Kennesaw Mountain.

This position

was made very strong in order to protect the railroad which was in
working order all the way to McPherson's skirmish line.38

Continuing

the line southward was Thomas' army, with that of Schofield on the
southern extremity of the Union forces and slightly refusing Sherman s
right flank.

Heavy skirmishes

were a daily occurence, but nowhere

were any substantial gains achieved that would force Johnston to retreat.
As the delay continued, Sherman became increasingly worried about
his railroad supply line.

35ibid.,

In a message to Thomas, he revealed his

pp. 601-602.

Connolly, Three Years, pp. 223-224.

36cox, Atlanta, pp. 104, 117.
3?Upson, With Sherman, p. 115.
38Sherman,

Memoirs, p. 56.

Sherman, Memoirs, pp. 51-52.
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uneasiness:

"I believe he [Johnston] holds on to await till the last moment

the result of his cavalry raids to our rear."^

No large body of regular

Confederate cavalry was yet dispatched to break up the railroads supplying
Sherman, and the limited damage caused by the persistent partisan raids
was quickly and easily repaired.

But the worry caused by the stalemated

situation provided the impetus for Sherman's next move.
After the thwarted attempt to turn the Confederate left on June 22 at
the Battle of Kolb Farm, Sherman decided to abandon his usual tactic of
the flanking march and attack Johnston head-on.

The decision was made

partly because the state of the roads did not yet permit the heavy traffic
necessary for a march around the Confederate left flank, even though the
weather had cleared on the twenty-second, and by the battle on the twentyseventh, the temperature had risen to well over one hundred degrees. Three
attacks were launched on the morning of June 27, one each against the two
peaks of Kennesaw Mountain on the Confederate right and one against Johnston's
center at a point called the "Dead Angle."
the result was 2,500 Union casualties.

All three were repulsed, and

At the same time as these assaults,

Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox's division of Schofield's army probed far
to the south and occupied a position which threatened the Western and
Atlantic south of Marietta.

At the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, Sherman

learned his lesson about the futility of assaulting an entrenched position
directly.

With the roads now hardening fast and Cox's division in a threat

ening position, Sherman decided on a bold move. He would take up the rail
road back to Allatoona and guard the pass and depot with a portion of

39OR,

1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 535.
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Garrard's cavalry.

Then he would send McPherson's army to flank the Kennesaw

line along the same route as Cox.

For this maneuver, the supply wagons

would carry ten days' rations.^
As early as June 22, preparations were begun for the march, and from
then until July 2, supplies were accumulated.

Throughout this period,

Schofield complained that his troops were not receiving enough provisions,
for he was farther from his depot at Allatoona than the other two armies
were from theirs.

The situation worsened when scurvy broke out in the Army

of the Ohio around June 30M

By the time the flanking march began, how

ever, the supply discrepancies and scurvy were corrected, and all of Sher
man's armies were primed and ready to go.
On the night of July 2, McPherson left his position on Sherman's
extreme left, and his trenches were occupied by Garrard's troopers in an
attempt to keep the Confederates from realizing what the Federals were
doing.

Soon, however, Johnston learned of the Union move, and he abandoned his

positions on Kennesaw, and withdrew to Smyrna, on the railroad four miles
south of Marietta.

Thinking he could catch Johnston in the confusion of

crossing the Chattahoochee River and destroy him, Sherman ordered all his
armies to pursue the Confederates.
ing with the Confederate rear

The next two days were spent skirmish

guard. Finally, on July 4, Johnston occupied

an exceptionally strong line of earthworks that had been prepared ahead of
time to protect the Western and Atlantic railroad bridge across the Chatta
hoochee.

With his plan to wreck Johnston foiled, Sherman pondered his

4°Sherman, Memoirs, pp. 61-62.
41QR, 1, XXXVIII, 4, p. 645. OR, 1, XXXVIII, 5, pp. 20-22.
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next move.

In the meantime, the Union lines of supply and communication

would have to catch up with the armies.
On July 3, just as the pursuit of Johnston to the river began, Sherman
ordered Wright to commence repairs on the railroad so that it could keep
the Union troops well provisioned.
area

Construction trains summoned from the

of Buzzard Roost were delayed by a guerilla raid but reached Big

Shanty on the morning of July 5 and started working immediately.

In only

one day, the two small breaks near Marietta and Vining's Station were re
paired, and trains ran to the latter place.43

Because Sherman felt he

would spend several days probing the Chattahoochee for suitable crossings,
he directed that a new field depot be established at Marietta so that
supplies could be stockpiled there for transfer to army supply wagons. To
assist the Quartermaster Department in unloading provisions in Marietta,
three regiments, each with an average strength of 330 men, were detailed
from each army.43

In addition, a brigade of infantry was encamped near

Kennesaw Mountain to guard the railroad and to defend Marietta in case of
attack.

Buildings in Marietta itself were altered to function as forts

for the added protection of the town and the depot.

Finally, the Military

Division of the Etowah was extended to include Kennesaw Mountain.44
On July 7, the Federal troops crossed the Chattahoochee River at two
places. A detachment from Schofield's army used pontoon boats and surprised
a Confederate unit at Soap Creek which empties into the Chattahoochee from

42OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 65. OR, 3, V, p. 954.

43OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 113.

4AIbid.,

pp. 43, 62-63, 113, 141-142.
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the west bank about five miles north of Vining's Station.

Once across,

they fortified their position in anticipation of a counterattack which
never came.

Meanwhile, Garrard's troopers crossed the Chattahoochee at

Roswell, a small manufacturing town also on the west bank of the river
and twelve miles north of Vining's Station.

During the next two days,

Major-General Greenville M. Doge's Sixteenth Corps crossed at Roswell,
and Major-General Howard's corps of Thomas' army followed suit at Power's
Ferry, two miles south of Soap Creek.

So, by July 9, large portions of

Sherman's forces were on the east or Atlanta side of the Chattahoochee
at three places, and Johnston's position on the west side had become un
tenable.

That night, he withdrew across the river and burned the railroad

bridge and three other neighboring bridges, two of them pontoon and one
of the trestle variety.

When Sherman informed Washington of the situation

on July 11, he was in control of both banks of the Chattahoochee and he
predicted that now would "commence the real game for Atlanta, and I expect
pretty sharp practice, but 1 think we have the advantage, and propose to
keep it."^~*
From July 10-16, the Federals prepared for the final phase of the
campaign, the actual fight for Atlanta itself.

During these days, Sherman s

soldiers busied themselves "in strengthening the several points for the
proposed passage of the Chattahoochee, in increasing the number and capacity
of the bridges, rearranging the garrisons to our rear, and in bringing
forward supplies.Provisions were accumulated at Chattanooga, Allatoona,

^Ibid. 9 pp. 113-114.
^Sherman, Memoirs, p. 71.
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and Marietta, with some even collected as far forward as Vining's Station.47
To provide additional capacity to the depot, a sidetrack was added at
Allatoona to accommodate more railroad cars.

At the front, because of the

yet uncertain hold of the Union forces on the east bank of the Chattahoochee,
supply wagons were allowed to cross the river only to unload their cargo.
As soon as this task was completed, they were returned to the west bank,
where they could be more easily protected.4®

With these preparations,

Sherman figured that if the railroad were broken by cavalry action between
Nashville

and Chattanooga or between Chattanooga and Allatoona, his armies

could live on stockpiled supplies from the closest depot and continue the
struggle for Atlanta.49

With everything in readiness, Sherman's troops

began the general advance against Atlanta on July 17.

47OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, pp. 137, 150.

48ibid., pp. 120, 122.
49pbid., p. 150.

CHAPTER V
"THE SINGLE THREAD THAT CONNECTS US WITH HOME AND SUPPLIES IS BROKEN,"
JULY 17 - SEPTEMBER 2, 1864

Sherman's plan for subduing Atlanta called

for a general advance along

the railroad and from the various crossings of the Chattahoochee in order
to cover the line of supply and not expose
Confederate cavalry.

it to any sudden lunges by

At the same time, the Union right would extend south

ward on the east side of the city in an attempt to sever the Georgia Rail
road, leading east to August.

Thus, Johnston would be faced with the

unenviable decision of protecting either Atlanta or the Georgia road,
for his numbers did not permit both.^-

(See Map 4 on Page 85 for movements

of armies from July 17 - September 2, 1864.)
For the move on the city, each of Sherman's armies "was supplied by
a separate route in order to avoid unnecessary confusion."2

Because the

railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee had not been rebuilt, all supplies
had to be picked up at points on the west bank of the river and transported
by wagon over the pontoon bridges and unloaded at the Federal camps. McPherson
drew his provisions from Marietta by way of Roswell.

Schofield's supplies

came from Smyrna, while those of Thomas were loaded at Vining's Station.
On July 18, without previous warning, from Richmond, General John
B. Hood succeeded Johnston in command of the Army of Tennessee.

The growing

dissatisfaction of Confederate President Jefferson Davis at Johnston s

1QR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 108.

2Clauss,

Cox, Atlanta, p. 146.

"Rail Support," p. 416.
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seeming inability to arrest the progress of Sherman brought the sudden
change.

Hood was known throughout the Union and Confederate armies as a

fighter, but he also had a reputation for brashness and foolhardiness in
battle.

Grievous wounds suffered at Gettysburg and Chickamauga, which

led to the incapacity of his right arm and the amputation of his left
leg, respectively, were the grim testament to his unthinking courage.

Hood

wasted no time in changing Johnston's strategy of recent months.
On July 20, he attacked portions of the Army of the Cumberland as
they were crossing Peachtree Creek, a westerly-flowing stream north of
Atlanta that empties into the Chattahoochee River.

The Battle of Peachtree

Creek resulted in many more Confederate casualties than Federal.

Two days

later, after the advance of McPherson's troops on the east side of Atlanta
cut the Georgia Railroad, Hood sallied forth from the city's defenses in
another attempt to pick off a portion of the Union armies.

This time,

Hood employed Sherman's favorite maneuver — the flanking march.

During

the night of July 21, General William H. Hardee's Confederate corps marched
around the left flank of McPherson's army.

Throughout the next day, Hardee's

corps and that of Confederate General Stephen D. Lee assaulted the Union
lines, in some cases from front and rear

simultaneously.

But McPherson's

troops held, and again Hood's casualties far outweighed those of Sherman,
phis engagement, called the Battle of Atlanta, did result in one tremendous
loss for the Union.
While riding to an endangered portion of his line, General McPherson
was shot and killed by Confederate skirmishers.

The death of one of the

Army's most promising officers was a great blow to Sherman.

More often than

not, McPherson's troops had composed the flanking columns that had led to
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success after success for the Federals during the campaign.

In consultation

with Thomas and Schofield, it took Sherman five days to decide on McPherson's
successor.

The final choice was Major-General Oliver Otis Howard, who was

in command of the Fourth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland.

For the

remainder of the campaign, Howard performed admirably, and the effective
ness of the Army of the Tennessee was not diminished.
During the Battle of Atlanta, one aspect of the fighting foreshadowed
events to come.

General Joseph H. Wheeler's Confederate cavalry corps

accompanied Hardee on his flanking march.

Instead of participating in the

attack on McPherson's front line divisions, Wheeler's troopers rode farther
eastward and struck the Army of the Tennessee's supply wagons parked at
Decatur, situated on the Georgia Railroad about five miles east of Atlanta.
The wagon park was defended by the brigade of Colonel John W. Sprague
who, with the assistance of another brigade of Federal infantry, success
fully defended the wagons in his charge.

Sprague "got his teams harnessed

up, and safely conducted his train to the rear of Schofield's position,
holding in check Wheeler's cavalry till he got off all his trains, with
the exception of three or four wagons.in about three weeks' time,
Wheeler would begin a similar operation but for much higher stakes.
With the Georgia Railroad irreparably cut and the Western and Atlantic
already in Union hands, Sherman began a series of movements designed to
sever Hood's two remaining railroad supply lines, the Atlanta and West
Point and the Macon and Western.

Both of these lines met at a small town

six miles southwest of Atlanta known as East Point.
continued as a single track into the city.

From there, they

The maneuver called for the

^Sherman, Memoirs, p. 80. Cox, Atlanta, p. 171.
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Army of the Tennessee to leave its position astride the Georgia road and
march behind the Armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland to the west side of
Atlanta.

A thrust at the two open railroads could be organized there.

Because of the uneasiness caused by Wheeler's attack on Decatur, all of
Sherman's supply wagons, except those few directly attached to each division,
were grouped for safety behind Thomas' army in the center of the Union
position.

They could leave this area only when going to pick up and deliver

supplies.4
The march concluded in the Battle of Ezra Church on July 28.

This

small Methodist house of worship was the scene of the last of Hood's
sallies from the defenses of Atlanta.

Here, as with the two previous

battles, Confederate losses were far higher than those of the Union troops.
In the short space of eight days, Hood had bled his army to exhaustion.
The result was the retreat of his badly demoralized troops into the defenses
of Atlanta and the beginning of the month-long siege of the city.
During the movement that resulted in the action of Ezra Church, began
the rebuilding of the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee.

By order

of General Thomas, the work, which "presented the most formidable engineer
ing problem that had yet confronted the [Construction] Corps during the
campaign,commenced on July 23.

The endeavor was supervised by the

Corps' most outstanding engineer, E. C. Smeed, and carried out by the First
and Third Divisions of bridge builders.^

Work on the structure was stopped

at noon the next day, because a defeat in battle on the west side of Atlanta

4OR, 1, XXXVIII, 5, pp. 269, 331.
5Clauss,

"Rail Support," p. 417.

6OR, 3, IV, p. 958.
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could have resulted in a retreat that would leave potentially a finished
railroad bridge in Confederate hands.

Construction started again on

August 2 and ended three days later.
On August 5, railroad service to the camps was resumed, and Union
Army supply wagons rolled regularly to within three miles of Atlanta. The
job had required four and one-half days in all, and the bridge itself was 780
feet long and 92 feet high.

The timber required to complete the span

was gathered in the surrounding woods, and the stone piers left standing
by the hastily

withdrawing Confederates were used to support the framework.7

Despite the short time required to complete the bridge, "no night work was
done upon it whatever, but the men worked from daylight till dark, with
one hour intermission at noon for dinner.At the time of its completion,
the bridge was the largest yet built by the Construction Corps and a fitting
example of the efficient and superb work done throughout the campaign by
the men of the United States Military Railroad.
Also concurrent with the fighting at Ezra Church was the first of
several Union cavalry raids launched to sever Hood's remaining railroads.
The raiding force was composed of the commands of Major-General George
Stoneman and Brigadier-General Edward M. McCook.

The plan called for

them to strike the Macon and Western about twenty miles south of Atlanta
at Jonesboro.

Before the expedition began, Stoneman asked Sherman to

allow him to continue on to the Confederate prisoner-of-war camp at
Andersonville, Georgia after the destruction of the railroad for the
purpose of freeing the

7Clauss,

80R,

Union soldiers incarcerated there. Though he
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considered it a risky adventure, Sherman agreed.
The raid began on July 28, and rather than joining McCook on the
railroad, Stoneman rode to Macon, where he was captured.

Instead of

liberating the prisoners at Andersonville, he became one of them.

McCook

reached the railroad but was chased away by Wheeler's Confederate troopers
before he could finish the job of wrecking the track.

Some of McCook's

men were eventually captured, while the rest limped back to Marietta.

The

railroad was quickly repaired, and the flow of supplies to Hood was not
interrupted.

Sherman was so disgusted with the performance of his cavalry

that he decided to use it "hereafter to cover the railroad, and use
infantry and artillery against Atlanta."9
Because of the mobile defense provided for the army by the cavalry,
Sherman became very worried for the safety of both his wagon trains and his
railroads during the absence of Stoneman and McCook.

To provide better

protection for his wagons, Sherman ordered them placed behind the center
of his forces or on the west bank of the Chattahoochee.^
his concern for the railroads in a communique
D.

Webster in Nashville.

He expressed

to Brigadier-General Joseph

"The enemy," Sherman wrote, "will surely be on

our railroad very soon."^
Coupled with the possibility of a Confederate effort to break their
line of supply, the Federals were running low on ammunition.

The tremendous
\

expenditures in the three battles initiated by Hood's sallies from Atlanta's

90R,

1, XXXVIII, 5, pp. 340, 446.

-^Ibid.,

p. 256.

-^Ibid.,

p. 321.
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trenches, the ongoing siege of the city, and the skirmishing so character
istic of the entire campaign caused Sherman to issue orders regulating the
firing of his artillery.

For example, each army commander was directed on

August 1 to allow his artillery batteries only ten to fifteen shots directly
at the city of Atlanta from

4 p.m. till dark.-^

In addition, Sherman

decided to extend his earthworks toward East Point in order to stretch
Hood's defending lines to the breaking point because the Confederate works
were too formidable, "and we cannot spare the ammunition for a

bombardment."-^

The need to conserve his supply of ammunition would be a nagging problem
for Sherman through the end of the campaign.
After the Battle of Ezra Church, when Sherman's armies were grouped
on the west side of Atlanta, the depot at Roswell was no longer needed.
The bridge over the Chattahoochee connecting the depot with the line of
supply to the Army of the Tennessee was destroyed on August 6, and from that
time, Howard's troops drew their provisions entirely from the stores at
Vining's Station.lZf

The destruction of the bridge was reported the next

day by Marietta's garrison commander, Brigadier-General John McArthur.

His

message to Sherman also warned of clouds of dust which had been seen east
of Roswell.15

These could indicate a move by Hood's cavalry to break the

Western and Atlantic Railroad.

Because the Union cavalry division of

Brigadier-General Kenner Garrard was operating in the vicinity of Roswell

12Ibid.,

pp. 324, 325.

-^Ibid.,

p. 308.

-^Ibid.,

pp. 238, 406.

15Ibid_.,

p. 417.
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and presumably would have reported sighting any

dust clouds, Sherman did

not believe that Confederate horsemen were riding to threaten his supply
line to Chattanooga.

Sherman, however, did not dismiss the possibility.

He cautioned McArthur to be vigilant, because soon "the enemy will attempt
by his cavalry to strike our road."18
Sherman did not have to wait long for the fulfillment of his prediction.
On August 11, Garrard sent an urgent message that "a large part"1^ of Hood's
cavalry was in the vicinity of Covington, east of Decatur, and that they
were reported to be assembling for a raid into Tennessee and possibility
on into Kentucky.

One of Sherman's greatest fears since the beginning of the

campaign, that the Confederate cavalry would be turned loose to break his
railroad supply line, was about to be realized.

(See Map 5 on page 93 for

Wheeler's Raid.)
The recent and ineffective Union cavalry raids had convinced Hood
that he could safely detach his own horsemen to operate on the Union rail
lines.18

Hood ordered Wheeler to assemble a force of approximately 4,000

troopers at Covington, well to the east of the area occupied by the contend
ing armies and thus, he hoped, beyond the watchful eyes of the Union cavalry
patrolling near Roswell. Wheeler's mission was to ride north and tear up
the Western and Atlantic as he advanced.

He would then cross the Tennessee

l6Ibid.
17Ibid.,
18Stanley

p. 459.

F. Horn, The Army of Tennessee (Indianapolis, Indiana: The
Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1941), p. 363. John Bell Hood, Advance and Retreat.
Personal Experiences in the United States and Confederate States Armies
(Bloomington: Indiana~~University Press, 1959), pp. 197-198. Hereinafter
cited as Hood, Advance.
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River near Chattanooga and ride to destroy the Nashville and Chattanooga
and the Nashville and Decatur railroads, while leaving 1,200 men behind
to harass any crews attempting to repair the track in Georgia and to break
it again should it be mended.

After destroying the railroads leading south

from Nashville, Wheeler was to return to Hood's lines about Atlanta by way
of the Western and Atlantic and tear it up again.19

in

all, it was a

rather grandiose and in fact unrealistic plan considering the size of the
raiding force versus the well-organized and heavily defended garrisons,
supply centers, and railroads supporting Sherman's armies.
A period of anxious waiting set in as Sherman looked for Wheeler's
first blow.

It came on August 13, when Sherman wired McArthur at Marietta,

"See at once as to who and what force broke the road at or near Acworth.
It is, in my judgement, a mere cut, having a bearing on something
Sherman was right.

The diversion near Acworth was designed to draw attention

away from the main columns of Confederate raiders.
force in two.

"20

beyond.

Wheeler had divided his

He rode with the divisions of Generals J. H. Kelly and W. T. C.

Hume in their advance on Dalton, while General William T. Martin's division
pounded toward Tilton.

After his work of destruction was done at Tilton,

Martin would join the main column near Dalton.

Why Wheeler chose these

two relatively unimportant railroad towns as his points of attack and
not the railroad bridges over the Oostanaula and the Etowah or the depot
at Allatoona is puzzling.

Perhaps he and Hood believed that striking lightly

guarded towns would make the work of wrecking the railroad easier, especially
considering the small size of Wheeler's forces and the recent exhausting

•*-9john p. Dyer, "Fightin' Joe" Wheeler (University, Louisiana:

Louisiana State University Press, 1941), pp. 187-188. OR, 1, XXXVIII, 3, p. 957.
20OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 486.
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encounter with their Union counterparts south of Atlanta.2-*The first indication of any danger to Dalton came to Sherman on
August 14.

That morning he received a message from Colonel Green B. Raum,

commanding the garrison at Resaca.
"and reported captured."22

"Dalton has been attacked," Raum warned,

The Union garrison at Dalton, commanded by

Colonel Bernard Laiboldt, engaged Wheeler's troopers for two hours before
being driven through the town to an earthwork constructed for the defense
of the railroad.

There they were approached three times under a flag of

truce by the Confederates, calling on the Federals to surrender.
message to Laiboldt, Wheeler urged:

In his

"To prevent the unnecessary effusion

of blood, I have the honor to demand the immediate and unconditional sur
render of the forces under your command at this garrison."23

Laiboldt

retorted: "I have been placed here to defend this post, but not to sur
render."2^

After the third refusal, Wheeler brought up two artillery

pieces and began to shell the earthwork and continued the bombardment
throughout the night.23
On the same day, General Steedman in Chattanooga received an urgent
message from Laiboldt telling of the siege of the garrison at Dalton and
requesting reinforcements.

Steedman hurriedly gathered a force of about

2,000 infantry from the vicinity and directed them to be ready to move
at a moment's notice.

21Ibid.,

At 6 p.m., they were loaded onto railroad cars

p. 957. Hood, Advance, pp. 197-198.

22OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 503.

23OR,

1, XXXVIII, 1, p. 324.

25Ibid.
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and headed south toward Dalton.

The train was halted, however, by other

trains fleeing northward away from Wheeler's Confederates.28
Early the next day, August 15, Wheeler broke off his siege of Dalton
because of the absence of expected reinforcements from
and began to withdraw north toward Tunnel Hill.

Martin's division

When Laiboldt quickly

organized his men to attack the retreating Confederates, Steedman heard
the firing and was relieved to know that Dalton was still holding out.

He

continued on to the town, unloaded his troops, and helped Laiboldt's men
drive Wheeler's force away.

Steedman could not pursue, however, because

he had no cavalry with him.

One unusual feature of the fighting to relieve

Dalton was the use of several companies of the Fourteenth Regiment United
States Colored Troops by Steedman.27

Their participation in the operation

against Wheeler was the only instance of the employment of black troops
in battle in Georgia during the Atlanta Campaign.
On August 16, instead of crossing the Tennessee River near Chattanooga
and attempting to cut the railroads south of Nashville as ordered, Wheeler
rode into East Tennessee toward Knoxville.
more delighted.

Sherman could not have been

In a message to Washington, he wrote, "Wheeler cannot

disturb Knoxville or Loudon [Tennessee].

He may hurt some of the minor

points but, on the whole, East Tennessee is a good place for him to break
down his horses, and a poor place to steal new ones."28

At the same time

that Laiboldt and Steedman were engaging Wheeler, another force of infantry
numbering about 2,000 was being assembled in Cartersville from regiments

26OR,

1, XXXVIII, 2, p. 495.

27QR, 1, XXXVIII, 1, p. 324.
28OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 547.

OR, 1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 504.
OR, 1, XXXVIII, 2, pp. 495-496.
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sent from Rome and Marietta.

Like Steedman's group, they were loaded onto

a train and sent north to aid in the expulsion of Wheeler from Georgia.29
Sherman sent word with Brigadier-General John E. Smith, in command
of the expedition from Cartersville, to force Wheeler into the mountains
30
of North Carolina in order to wear down his horses in the rough terrain.
Wheeler managed to sidestep his pursuers and continue up the Tennessee
Valley, but he left behind a detachment of 200 picked men to disrupt any
attempts to repair the railroad and frequently to re-break it.31 When
he reached the vicinity of Knoxville, Wheeler turned his divisions west
ward, crossed the mountains, and headed for the railroads below Nashville.
In early September, he managed to tear up seven miles of the Nashville
and Chattanooga but was quickly chased out of Tennessee by a combination
of Union forces in the area.
Later that month, Wheeler and General Nathan B. Forrest launched another
raid, this time against the Nashville and Decatur and tore up nearly thirty
miles of that line.

This railroad, however, was no longer used by Sherman

for the transportation of supplies to the front.

Instead, since June,

only empty trains returning to Nashville from the front had used it.
Wheeler's and Forrest's actions in Middle Tennessee came so late and were
so ineffective that they did not alter the course of the Atlanta

Campaign.

29Ibid.,

3 3

pp. 514, 517. Jenkin Lloyd Jones, An Artilleryman's Diary
Wisconsin History Commission: Original Papers, No. 8 (Wisconsin History^
Commission, 1914), p. 239. Hereinafter cited as Jones, Artilleryman's Diar^.
30OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 513.

310R,

1, XXXVIII, 3, p. 958.

32Weber,

Northern, pp. 204—205. S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin, Sherman
and His Campaigns; A Military Biography (New York: Charles B. Richardson,
T865), p. 215. Hereinafter cited as Bowman and Irwin, Sherman.
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Since the cavalry was considered the eyes of the army and thus used primarily
to keep the opposing commanders informed about the movements of the enemy,
"Wheeler could only annoy Sherman; his absence might destroy

Hood."33

For all his efforts, Wheeler failed to do much harm to the Western
and Atlantic.

His raiders broke the railroad near Acworth and destroyed

a few miles of track in the vicinity of Dalton and the same north of Tunnel
Hill.34

Still, the damage did give the Union soldiers some worry.

In

response to the situation, Private Jenkin Lloyd Jones, an artillerist in
the garrison that protected the Etowah River bridge, wrote.
thread that connects us with home and supplies is broken."35

The single
Despite the

ever-present guerillas and the detachment of 200 men left by Wheeler, the
repair of the railroad and telegraph lines commenced immediately.

By

August 18, all the damage was repaired and full communication with Chatta
nooga was restored.

So, from the first break on the fourteenth until the

restoration of uninterrupted rail traffic on the nineteenth, operation
of the Western and Atlantic and its supporting telegraph service had been
36
interrupted for only five days.
Together with the strain on supplies occasioned by the three battles
between Sherman's and Hood's armies in late July and the resulting siege
of Atlanta, the temporary break in the rail line to Chattanooga caused a
flury

of orders cautioning commanders to be economical in their use of

provisions.

A circular from Brigadier-General William F. Barry, Sherman s

33Bowman

34OR,

and Irwin, Sherman, p. 209.

1, XXXVIII, 3, p. 958.

35Jones, Artilleryman's Diary, p. 240.
36QR, l, XXXVIII, 5, pp. 558-559, 566, 569, 588.
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chief of artillery, on August 15 cautioned battery commanders that "all
unnecessary or doubtful expenditure of field artillery ammunition be pro
hibited, and the strictest economy in its use be"37 practiced.
Sherman calculated that he had two weeks worth of supplies on hand.
If these provisions were husbanded carefully, he could continue with his
plans to cut Hood's remaining railroads despite a possible lengthy inter
ruption of the flow of supplies from Chattanooga.

In this way, with both

the Federal and Confederate lines of supply broken, Sherman felt that he
could subsist long enough on his accumulated provisions to force Hood to
evacuate Atlanta.38

jn one

frugal with supplies.

instance, however, the Federals were not

In mid-August, Sherman brought down from Chattanooga

four 4.2 Inch Parrott rifles.

With these guns, he intended to shell the

city of Atlanta directly and thus demoralize the remaining citizens.
guns began firing on August 10 with about 4,000 rounds on hand.

The

Three days

later, the gun crews had exhausted their ammunition and any extra to be
found.

Not until the eighteenth, when more projectiles could be secured,

did the big guns resume their destructive

39

work.

As early as August 16, in the midst of Wheeler's raid, Sherman drew
up a plan for a movement which would result in the end of the campaign.
It called for all surplus and unfit men, horses, wagons, and other excess
material to be sent to the west side of the Chattahoochee River and placed
within the extensive earthworks used by Johnston in mid-July.

In this way,

they could be more easily protected from attacks by Hood's infantry or the

37Ibid.,

p. 519.

38Ibid.,

pp. 505. 528. 541.

39Ibid.,

pp. 447. 473. 571, 594.
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remainder of his cavalry.

To protect this position, the Twentieth Corps

would be detached from the main body of the army and entrenched on the
east bank of the Chattahoochee, covering the railroad bridge and Pace's
and Turner's ferries.
Sherman could then abandon his trenches before Atlanta and march
in a wide arc south and then southeastward.

In so doing, he would sever

the Atlanta and West Point Railroad at the towns of Red Oak and Fairburn.
After this job of destruction was completed, the march would be continued
to Jonesboro, where the Macon and Western, Hood's last supply line, would
be broken.

With no railroads remaining to connect him to the rest of

the Confederacy, Hood would have no choice but to give up Atlanta.

Finally,

communication would be maintained between the Union forces on the west
side of the Chattahoochee and Sherman by defending the bridges at Sandtown,
on the river ten miles downstream from the railroad bridge, and the depots
at Allatoona and Marietta would be reinforced against the possibility of
cavalry attack.^
Although it was a complex plan calling for a great deal of coordination
among the various units, the present state of Hood's Confederates, demoral
ized and dimished in numbers from the heavy fighting in July and the result
ant siege, offered a very good chance for success. Even more important, the
bulk of Hood's cavalry was away on a useless raid in Tennessee, and any
movements of the Union forces would be hard to detect without plenty of
horsemen for scouting duty.

^Olbid., p. 546.
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As the orders trickled down to division level, each unit was directed
to select its best wagons in which to carry 100 rounds of musket ammunition
for each man.

Also, these same wagons were to carry fifteen days' forage

of 6 pounds of grain per day for each animal and fifteen days' rations for
the troops, in addition to the three days' quantity carried by each man in
his haversack.^

Such orders as these were typical of the campaign and

reflected the great amount of forethought and organization put into every
move by Sherman and all his officers on every level.
Before Sherman could complete his preparations for the march to
Jonesboro, he was approached by Brigadier-General Hugh Judson Kilpatrick,
who commanded a division of cavalry, about the possibility of yet another
raid on Hood's railroads.

Sherman agreed, hoping that a successful operation

would force Confederate evacuation of Atlanta and prevent him from having
to execute the risky and delicate maneuver he was planning.

From August 18-22,

Kilpatrick conducted his raid and did manage to break the Macon and Western
near Jonesboro.

On his return, Kilpatrick bragged that his effort had been

a success and that ten days would be required to repair the tracks. The
next day, however, trains were running into Atlanta as usual, and Sherman
"became more than ever convinced that cavalry could not or would not work
hard enough to disable a railroad properly, and therefore resolved at
once to proceed to the execution of my original plan.

/2

With the defense arrangements at the Chattahoochee completed and
his army trimmed down to 60,000 seasoned veterans,

43-Ibid. ,

p. 566.

^Sherman, Memoirs, p. 104.

Sherman began the
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final

march of the campaign on August 26.^3

As Sherman suspected, Hood

believed that the Federals were retreating because the Confederates did
not have sufficient cavalry to warn otherwise.

Also, not having heard

anything from Wheeler, Hood believed that the raid had succeeded in destroy
ing Sherman's railroad supply line and that the Union troops were retreating
across the Chattahoochee for lack of food.^
wrong.

Hood could not have been more

So, while the Federals advanced on Jonesboro and dangerously exposed

their left flank to Atlanta, no attempt was made by the Confederates to
take advantage of the situation.
During the march, Sherman's armies experienced a few supply problems,
some of which were not new.
of ammunition recurred.

The nagging problem of dwindling supplies

The rifled-muskets of the infantry were to be

fired "only when absolutely necessary," and artillery rounds were to be
used only in "case of absolute necessity" and even then "carefully expended."
The bland diet of the army and the scarcity of vegetables caused many
soldiers and even some officers to contract scurvy.

They remedied this

condition on the march by gathering green corn from nearby fields and
preparing it in the usual way by roasting it over a fire. Hence the name
"roasting ears" was used to describe this welcome break from the daily fare
of salt pork and army bread.^ As always, forage was hard to obtain in

43qr, 1, XXXVIII, 5, pp. 482, 678.
^4Cox, Atlanta, p. 197. Sherman, Memoirs, p. 105.
45OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, pp. 752, 761.

46sherman, Memoirs, pp. 106-107. Connolly, Three Years, p. 252. The
troops of both the Union and Confederate armies picked any fresh fruits
and vegetables they could find along the line of march. This practice
continued throughout the entire Atlanta Campaign, and it was done to prevent
scurvy which had been a problem in Sherman s armies, especially before the
campaign began. For further information, see: Upson, With Sherman, p. 122.
Jones, Artilleryman's Diary, pp. 230-231. Connolly, Three Years, p. 216.
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sufficient quantities.

What corn the soldiers did not pick was collected

for the horses and mules, and some extra grain came by way of Sandtown from
stocks in the rear of the army.47
Sherman's advance intersected the Atlanta and West Point Railroad
at Fairburn and Red Oak as scheduled.

At each place, Federal infantry

thoroughly wrecked the railroad on August 29.

By the thirty-first, they

had crossed the Flint River, west of Jonesboro about two miles, and had
brought the town and the railroad under direct artillery fire.

That day

and the next, September 1, the Battle of Jonesboro was fought against two
of Hood's corps that were rushed south to try to keep Sherman off the Macon
and Western.

In the meantime, detachments of Confederate cavalry tested

the position of the Twentieth Corps at the Chattahoochee but found the
troops too strongly entrenched about the railroad and ferries.^8

During

the night of September 1-2, the defeated Confederates at Jonesboro withdrew
south along the railroad seven miles to Lovejoy Station.
Realizing that his last railroad was cut by the defeat at Jonesboro,
Hood ordered the destruction of whatever his men could not carry or would
be of use to the Federals, and then he joined the rest of the army at
Lovejoy.

The explosions heard during the night resulting from Hood's work

of destruction caused Sherman to fear for the safety of the troops defending
the railroad who, he felt, might be under assault by the Confederate forces
remaining in Atlanta.

With dawn on September 2 came welcome news from

Major-General Henry W. Slocum, then commanding the Twentieth Corps. Atlanta

47OR,

1, XXXVIII, 5, pp. 639, 697.

48xbid., pp. 691-692.
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was in Union hands!

Sherman briefly opposed the new Confederate line at

Lovejoy, but deciding against further continuation of the campaign, he
marched his army back to Atlanta to enjoy its hard-won victory and to
receive a much-needed rest and refitting.
On September 3, Colonel Wright was directed to repair the railroad
into Atlanta, and with a division of the Construction Corps held at the
Chattahoochee for that task, the track was mended and trains arrived in the
conquered city the same day.49

Sherman then sent to Washington his famous

message: "So Atlanta is ours, and fairly won."50

The apt words of one

Civil War historian, George Edgard Turner, describe the Atlanta Campaign:
"The railroads had sustained the victor, and the loss of them had ended
the resistance of the vanquished."51

49Ibid.,

50OR,

p. 781. OR, 3, V, p. 952.

1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 777.

5lTurner, Victory, p. 335.

CHAPTER VI
"THE GREAT QUESTION OF THE CAMPAIGN WAS ONE OF SUPPLIES"

The logistical effort by the Union armies during the Atlanta Campaign
may be broken down into three distinct phases.

During the first phase,

which extended from May 5-20, the Union supply line was extended through
the rugged mountains of northwest Georgia and across two major rivers, the
Oostanaula and the Etowah.

The second phase ended with the crossing of

the Chattahoochee River on July 10.

It witnessed tremendously heavy rains,

which hindered the movement of supplies through the dense forests, and
fierce fighting against the fortified Confederate lines at Dallas, Kennesaw Mountain, and the Chattahoochee River.

The final phase, ending with

the surrender of Atlanta on September 2, saw the costliest fighting. The
unsuccessful raid on the Western and Atlantic Railroad by Wheeler's cavalry
was the single biggest supply problem during the final weeks of the campaign.
General Sherman left no doubt about what had been uppermost in his
mind during the Atlanta Campaign.

"The great question of the campaign,"

he declared in his memoirs, "was one of supplies."1

And the single most

important factor in maintaining the steady flow of provisions to the front
was the railroad.

Brigadier-General Daniel C. McCallum, who was Director

and General Manager of the United States Military Railroad, worked closely
with Sherman in providing the rail transportation so vital to the Union
victory in Georgia.

In determining the value of the railroads to the cam

paign, he recalled:

1Sherman,

Memoirs, p. 8.
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Over this single line of railroad the provisions, clothing, and camp
equipage of the men, forage for animals, arms, ammunition, and ordnance
stores, re—enforcements, and all the varied miscellaneous supplies required
for a great army engaged in an active campaign, were sent to the front,
and by it were returned the sick, wounded, disabled, and discharged sol
diers, refugees, and freedmen, captured prisoners and materials deemed
advisable to send to the rear.3

After the war, in his memoirs, Sherman determined the importance of
railroads to his campaign by calculating the amount of wagon transporta
tion he would have needed to replace the railways.

To supply the three

Union armies in Georgia would have required 36,800 army supply wagons,
each pulled by 6 mules and carrying 2 tons of cargo, and each travelling
twenty miles daily.

Pausing to consider his figures, Sherman asserted

that such a task would have been "a simple impossibility in roads such as
then existed in that region of country."3

The fact that the rains of June

combined with the rough dirt roads to bring Sherman's 5,000 supply wagons
almost to a halt, makes his assertion even more credible.
A summary of the achievements of McCallum's railroads will outline
their contribution to the success of Sherman in the campaign.

The three

principal railroads, the Louisville and Nashville, which was privately
owned and run, the Nashville and Chattanooga, and the Western and Atlantic
totalled four hundred and seventy-three miles.

Over these trunklines each

day came 160 cars each hauling 10 tons for a total of 1600 tons.

This

tonnage "exceeded the absolute necessity of the army for one day."4 From
November 1, 1863 to September 14, 1864, a total of 298,528 tons of freight

20R,

3, V, p. 987.

o

JSherman,
4Ibid.

Memoirs, p. 399.
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and approximately 140,000 troops was delivered in the Military Division
of the Mississippi.

Return traffic was also important.

During the same

time, 50,000 tons of freight and 100,000 men, including Confederate pri
soners, sick and wounded soldiers, and veterans returning home, travelled
on empty trains returning to pick up more provisions.
The important railroads through central Tennessee, which were con
tained in the Department of the Cumberland, experienced a tremendous growth
in track mileage and rolling stock.

The number of miles of track increased

from one hundred and twenty-three to nine hundred and fifty-six, the num
ber of cars from 350 to 1,500, the number of locomotives from 30 to 165,
and the number of cars dispatched per day from 40 to 150. The size of the
train crews also grew accordingly.-^

In all $21,500,000 were spent on the

railroads in the Military Division of the Mississippi during the months
preceding the campaign and those encompassed by it.^
It was not enough to run the trains on time and deliver freight; the
constant repair of existing lines and construction of new ones was also
necessary.

The retreating Confederate forces and mounted Southern gueril

las destroyed some track.

For example, as the Union forces advanced south

ward along the Western and Atlantic, W. W. Wright's Construction Corps
was required to rebuild twenty-two and a half miles of track and four thou
sand and eighty-one linear feet of bridges.^

From December, 1863 to

August, 1864, Wright's men used 6,000,000 board feet of bridge timber and

50R,

3, IV, p. 883.

60R,

3, V, pp. 298, 589.

^Ibid., p. 987.
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500,000 cross-ties and were paid $1,222,767.41 for their labor.8
Evidence of the superb work of the Construction Corps is shown in a
reported conversation between two Confederate soldiers as they sat atop
Kennesaw Mountain in late June and saw the smoke from the engines pulling
carloads of supplies to the depots provisioning Sherman's troops.

As

recorded in Sherman's memoirs from a postwar conversation with Joseph E.
Johnston, the exchange began with one Confederate announcing to his comrades:

'Well, the Yanks will have to git up and git now, for I have heard
General Johnston himself say that General Wheeler had blown up the tunnel
near Dalton, and that the Yanks would have to retreat, because they could
not get no more rations.'
'Oh, hell!' replied a listener, 'don't you know that old Sherman car
ries a duplicate tunnel along?'9

In terms of the various kinds of supplies shipped to the front aboard
the trains, preference was given first to ammunition, followed in order by
clothing, provisions for the men, and forage for the horses.-'-8

Even on a

typical day, tremendous amounts of supplies were sent to the front lines.
On June 1, for example, 78 railroad cars left Chattanooga and headed for
Sherman's camps.

Four of these contained ammunition, 24 carried subsis

tence stores, 48 were loaded with forage, and 2 transported Quartermaster
stores.H

80R,

3, IV, pp. 959-960.

^Sherman, Memoirs, p. 151.
1°0R, 1, XXXVIII, 5, p. 351.
HEdward L. Hartz, Assistant Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Cumber
land, Quartermaster Department, United States Army, Letterbook, May 3,
1864 to July 18, 1864, in the collection of the Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. MS 82-226, p. 26. Hereinafter cited as Hartz, Letterbook.
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The variety of items included in a typical shipment of Quartermaster
stores was staggering.

For example, on June 15, 93,000 articles were sent

to the depot at Allatoona.

These included 10,000 pairs of trousers, 15,000

shirts, 5,000 pairs of drawers, 20,000 stockings, 20,000 bootees, 2,000
knapsacks, 2,000 canteens, 2,000 haversacks, 500 rubber blankets and ponchos,
1,000 shelter tents, 1,000 woolen blankets, 2,000 pairs of cavalry trousers,
1,000 jackets, 1,000 fatigue blouses, 2,000 shovels, 2,000 spades, 1,000
picks and handles, and 1,000 axes and handles.12

A shipment of Quarter

master stores might also include nails and shoes for horses and mules,
wagon wheels, various pieces of harness equipment, and wagon grease.13
As mentioned numerous times, forage was a continual problem for Sherman.
From November 1, 1863 to April 14, 1864, a total of 2,122,145 bushels of
corn, 3,382,200 bushels of oats, and 20,000 tons of hay was issued at the
Nashville depot.^

These enormous quantities notwithstanding, Sherman was

still forced to supplement forage issued by the Army with that procured
locally throughout the campaign.
also great.

The number of animals and wagons was

Between November 1, 1863 and September 1, 1864, a total of

41,122 horses, used primarily by the cavalry and the artillery, 38,724
mules, and 3,795 wagons was issued.-^
Although much of the long forage or hay eaten by the animals of Sherman^
armies came from the countryside, great quantities were shipped on the

12Ibid.,

p. 145.

-l^xbid., p. 148.
140R,

3, IV, p. 883.

-^Ibid.
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railroad.

A representative shipment came on July 4.

A total of 982,500

pounds of grain was transported which left 3,436,900 pounds of grain and
2,280 pounds of hay remaining in

Chattanooga.-^

As these figures show,

most of the grain issued during the campaign came from the Army's stocks,
while the vast majority of the hay was procured locally and receipts given
which could be presented later to Union authorities for reimbursement.
One key element that is often overlooked in Sherman's supply system
was the steamboat.

First used in the Mexican War, its carrying capacity

exceeded that of the typical train of railroad cars.

The average river

steamboat of the Civil War period could transport 200 tons of freight,
while a train of 10 cars, each with a capacity of 10 tons, could manage
only 100 tons."^

During the season of navigation on the Cumberland River,

from February to May, 1864, a total of 614 steamboats and barges carrying
158,016 tons of freight docked at Nashville.

At 50 to 60 cents per 100

18

pounds, the cost of transporting this freight was nearly $2,000,000.

Supplies carried by steamboat also found their way to Nashville up the
Tennessee River and then along the connecting line of the Nashville and
Northwestern Railroad.

By making connections with railroads in northern

Alabama, upriver from Muscle Shoals, steamboats were able to deliver sup
plies in limited quantity directly to Chattanooga by way of the Tennessee.
The total figures for the amount of Quartermaster stores issued from
November 1, 1863 to September 1, 1864 from the Nashville depot are listed below:

-^Hartz,

Letterbook, p.394.

"^Sherman, Memoirs, p. 399.
180R,

1, LIT, p. 706.
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Sibley tents..
Hospital tents
Wall tents....
Shelter tents.
Trousers:
Infantry
Mounted.
Greatcoats
Coats
Blouses...
Shirts....

4,350
2,117
3,006
131,848
397,112
145,581
112,843
64,999
342,590
466,854

Drawers
Stockings
Shoes
Boots.....
Blankets;
Woolen
Water-proof..
Hats
Caps
Knapsacks
Canteens.

574,538
975,201
445,355
178,532
182,300
107,715
253,136
75,436
116,016
163,40219

During the same time period, the Quartermaster depot at Nashville spent
$14,000,000, exclusive of the money spent in connection with the military
railroad service.
In most previous campaigns, both by European and American armies,
the expenditure of ammunition was not excessive.

During the Atlanta Cam

paign, however, ammunition was used at an enormous rate.

The reason lies

in the fact that even though full-scale battles were few, they were very
intense, and skirmishes with the Confederates were a daily occurrence.
The total consumption of small-arms ammunition was 22,137,132 rounds.
Broken down further, 21,340,222 of the rounds were for the rifled-muskets
the standard single-shot infantry weapon; the remaining 796,910 rounds
were fired from all other small-arms combined.These figures dispel
forever the commonly held notion that the Union troops used tremendous num
bers of repeating arms during the Atlanta Campaign.
lery rounds fired is on a par with the small-arms.

190R,

3, IV, p. 883

20jbid.
210R,

1, XXXVIII, 1, p. 126.

The number of artil
In all, 149,670 round
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were expended; of these, 97,464 were from rifled guns and 52,206 from
smoothbore pieces.^2

Thus, it can be seen that rifled artillery, a pro

duct of the industrial revolution in the United States, had eclipsed the
traditional smoothbore guns, at least in Sherman's armies.
The Atlanta Campaign, and the Civil War in general, embodied the use
of many recent inventions, such as the railroad, the telegraph, the steam
boat, and rifled artillery, which helped bring victory to Sherman's blue
columns.

The whole Union effort in Georgia during the summer of 1864 is

best summarized by one of Sherman's division commanders, Brigadier-General
Jacob D. Cox:

The campaign as a whole will remain a most instructive example of
the methods of warfare which may be said to be the natural outcome of
modern improvements in weapons, and in means of transportation and commu
nication when used in a sparsely settled and very difficult if not imprac
ticable country.^

The European tradition of supplying armies during the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries was one of well-organized plunder.
The continent had been farmed for many centuries, and in most areas there
was plenty of food to support both the contending armies and the general
population:

witness the campaigns of the Swede, Gustavus Adolphus during

the Thirty Years War and most of the expeditions of Napoleon Bonaparte.
Another reason for this state of affairs was the lack of bureaucratic
states with armies that had organized and internally administered supply
systems.

By contrast, Americans, from colonial times through the Indian

22ibid.

23cox, Atlanta, p. 210.
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wars of the late nineteenth century, most often operated in at best under
developed and usually wilderness conditions.

Thus, American troops and

their enemies, with the exception of the Indians, learned to live off sup
plies provided by their armies out of necessity, because the countryside
could not meet all their needs.

Pertinent examples include the Saratoga

Campaign of 1777, the wars against the Indians of the Northwest Territory
the Creek War of 1813-1814, and General Taylor's march in northern Mexico
during the Mexican War.
By the mid-nineteenth century, two recent developments provided key
innovations to the practice of war.

These were the rise of bureaucratic

states and the ongoing industrial revolution.

The first provided organi

zation for much of society, including armies.

Army regulations clearly

delineating the functions of the various military departments, including
that of supply, date from the mid-eighteenth century and stem partly from
the growing concern of the rising middle class in Western society to pro
tect its property from the traditional deprivations visited on the popu
lace for centuries by European armies.

The second development, the indus

trial revolution, provided such technological innovations as the railroad
the steamboat, and the telegraph.

These three inventions allowed armies

to support themselves in the underdeveloped regions so typical of North
America with efficient means to transport provisions with speed and in
tremendous quantities over great distances.

The Atlanta Campaign is an

excellent example of how these developments came together.
Sherman used the steamboat-railroad-telegraph connection and the
organizational framework for supply provided in army regulations to meet
the daily needs of his men and animals.

With the lone exception of
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gathering a portion of his forage from local sources, this system worked
to perfection. One fact which presaged a fundamental change in the supply
of armies was the expenditure of ammunition by the Union troops during the
Atlanta Campaign.

From early May to Early September, 1864, infantrymen

fired an average of 63 rounds, while each artillery piece averaged 623 rounds.
This volume of ammunition consumption was higher than in previous European
and American campaigns and compared favorably with other Civil War campaigns.2^
After the Civil War, the supply system of the United States Army
reverted to what it had been during the Mexican War.

That is, the Army

was fighting in a rugged wilderness, the Great Plains and other undevel
oped areas of the West, and using the traditional army wagon and the packmule as the principal means of supplying the troops.
especially the steamboat were retained.

But the railroad and

In particular, contrary to popu

lar belief, the example of the extremely successful use of the railroads
during the Civil War was not absorbed in Europe.

So, during the Franco-

Prussian War of 1870-1871, the Prussian military railroad service broke
down after the initial mobile phase of the war during the first few months.
As a result, thousands of Prussian troops had to be detailed to gather in
local wheat and vegetable crops and were assigned the duty of preparing
the food for consumption by their army.2-*
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth, the development of repeating and automatic arms and gasoline

2^Van

Creveld, Supplying War, pp. 35, 57, 63, 102-103, 104, 110-111,
181. Huston, Sinews, pp. 157-158, 190-193. OR, 1, XXXVIII, 1, p. 126.
Sherman, Memoirs, pp. 24, 136.
2^Van

Creveld, Supplying War, pp. 75-108.
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and oil burning engines brought the methods of supplying troops in Europe
and the United States into line with each other.

No longer could Euro

peans put off organizing a supply system that provided all of their armies'
needs, food, ammunition, and gasoline included.

By contrast, the United

States Army could fall back on its tradition of provisioning its troops
through its own logistical organization.

Thus, beginning with World War

One, the armies of Western Europe came to rely exclusively on their own
supply network, and their American counterpart fitted easily into this
development.
The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 stands as a key phase in the evolution
ary process of armies relying on themselves for all their supplies.

In

essence, Sherman utilized the rise of bureaucratic states and the products
of the industrial revolution to wage what is widely considered to be the
single most important campaign of the American Civil War, and his effort
was a vital link in the chain leading to the reliance of modern armies on
their own supply networks to fill their material needs.

26Ibid.,

pp. 231-237.
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